NASA – The Rumor Mill

Following on the Tuesday meeting at NASA headquarters concerning revamping the governance structure, and Wednesday’s meeting between NASA administrator Charles Bolden and President Barack Obama, the rumor mill has been if full fury.

Wayne Hale offered this tweet: “Wondering if reports on Obama-Bolden meeting are accurate or just blather. No hard news has appeared.” To which Bob Jacobs, NASA’s deputy assistant administrator of Public Affairs responded: “Inaccurate. The meeting was informational, not decisional…”. Of course, that’s NASA’s spokesperson. Amy Klamper at Spacenews.com thinks “New Direction for NASA Could Wait Until February.”

Now comes Science magazine’s (AAAS) Insider report concerning the outcome of the meeting:

President Barack Obama will ask Congress next year to fund a new heavy-lift launcher to take humans to the moon, asteroids, and the moons of Mars, ScienceInsider has learned. The president chose the new direction for the U.S. human space flight program Wednesday at a White House meeting with NASA Administrator Charles Bolden, according to officials familiar with the discussion. NASA would receive an additional $1 billion in 2011 both to get the new launcher on track and to bolster the agency’s fleet of robotic Earth-monitoring spacecraft.

The major elements include:

• Elimination of the Ares I rocket
• Recommend Commercial development of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) launch capability for cargo and then crew.
• Development of a smaller heavy lift rocket along the lines proposed by the old NLS (National Launch System) NASA investigated in the early 1990’s and revived by the Direct Team between 2005 and today.
• Addition of $1 Billion to the Budget for NASA
• European countries, Japan, and Canada would be asked to work on a lunar lander and modules for a moon base.
• Focus on being able to perform a variety of missions including Near Earth Objects, Lagrange points, the Moon, the moons of Mars (Phobos and Deimos). See Option “5D”
• Additional probes to the Moon, Mars and and the moons of Mars.

Immediate blow back is expected from Senator Richard Shelby, who has asked the Inspector General at NASA to investigate “corruption” within the Augustine Commission. Shelby stated that several Augustine panel members were registered lobbyists who took “direct advantage of their temporary roles on the Commission to further their personal business.” This has been interpreted as a shot across the bow in the fight over Ares I and the jobs it creates at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Shelby’s state of Alabama. Whose bow it was aimed at is in question, and it looks like an act of desperation.

However, as noted in our Wrap Up report on the Augustine Commission, time is of the essence with regard to jobs and the retention of skills associated with building the 8.4 meter External Tank used by the space shuttle and the proposed heavy launch vehicle derived from the shuttle. If the politicians resist the change that’s coming to NASA, they may lose everything.

Denials to the Science Insider article came immediately from NASA and the White House. NASA spokesman Morrie Goodman said the article was “speculation.” White House spokesman Nicholas Shapiro echoed that characterization.

NASA – Change Is Coming

Considering the conclusions of the Final Report of the Augustine Commission (see our Wrap Up), change at NASA is inevitable. Can NASA change? Will NASA change?

Two items of interest.

First, Obama will be meeting with Gen. Charlie Bolden, NASA Administrator, today. The President’s schedule has the following entry:

3:05PM THE PRESIDENT meets with NASA Administrator Charles Bolden
Oval Office
Closed Press

Second, Keith Cowling at NASAWatch, reports that on Tuesday, 15 December:

All of NASA’s field center directors met today in a closed door session in one of the Administrator’s Conference Rooms on the 9th floor of NASA HQ. In addition to all of the center directors who were seated around the table, a dozen or so staffers stood around the periphery of the room. Their collective task was to work out and then agree upon a new governance structure for the agency – one that would best implement the new (revised) direction that the White House is providing to NASA. There are apparently 5 or so specific areas that the agency will be re-organizing itself to implement. As such, there may be a recasting of the “directorate” model in favor of “divisions”. All of the participants were sworn to secrecy and were not going to be leaving the room until a new governance model was agreed to.

What did they decide upon? Stay tuned.

The Augustine Commission – Final Report – Hits and Misses – Wrapped Up

“The Augustine Commission for Dummies”

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

Given the intent of the politicians to fight for the funding their districts currently receive from the Constellation Program (CxP – the current program developing the Ares I and Ares V rockets) as well as go begging for more, and given the budget constraints the NASA faces, it is instructive to see where this course will end up. In the Senate, Richard Shelby has announced his intention to fight for Constellation and will try to increase funding to the Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama. Senator Bill Nelson of Florida is fighting for Kennedy Space Center and all the jobs and funding there. In the House, Gabrielle Giffords of Arizona and Pete Olson of Texas have dug in their heels and reiterated their backing of the Constellation program (See Space News, 21 November 2009).

All this is taking place against the backdrop of the Augustine Commission’s Final Report, which has made it clear that Ares I is over budget and underpowered. As Jeff Greason said at the Committee deliberations, if Santa Clause gave us Ares I and Ares V tomorrow, we would have to scrap them immediately because they would be too expensive to operate.

The Forum at NasaSpaceFlight has been for many years the authoritative site for information on all things NASA. It has been home to the rebel alliance of NASA and industry engineers that have advocated the in-line shuttle derived launch vehicle for the past four years.

The source of this concern was former Administrator Michael Griffin’s decision in 2005 to replace the dual-launch, in-line shuttle derived architecture recommended by NASA engineers, with his personal choice of a small Ares I and a very large Ares V. Instead of building one rocket using existing shuttle components as Congress had directed, he would build two brand new rockets. This decision came just two weeks before the scheduled release of the NASA document on the Constellation program.

Now, four years later in 2009, when the in-line shuttle derived launch vehicle should have been making its first flight, we are five or six years away from Ares I making its first flight. The Shuttle is scheduled for retirement next year and America will have to buy seats on the Russian Soyuz to get to the International Space Station. And the International Space Station is scheduled for de-commissioning in 2015 and would be de-orbited into the Pacific Ocean.

This reality gave birth to the Augustine Commission and its Final Report. We have covered in detail the findings of the Committee. Now we look to consider the possible outcomes.

Philip Metschan (writing as ‘Phoegh’), a long time contributor to the Forum at NasaSpaceFlight, has produced a marvelous interactive series of graphics available at directlauncher.com that illustrate the options identified by the Augustine Commission.

The Budget and Time Line for these options are given in the following table. Included are destinations beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) and the impact of each option on the existing workforce.

Option	Extra $ / Yr	Through 2020	Through 2030	Moon	NEO	Depot	Workforce
Option 1	$0	$99 B	$205 B	?	?	?	50% Loss
Option 2	$0	$105 B	$200 B	?	?	?	60% Loss
Option 3	$3 B	$127 B	$275 B	2025	?	?	53% Loss
Option 4	$3 B	$121 B	$264 B	2030	?	?	70% Loss
Option 4B	$3 B	$118 B	$255 B	2029	?	2026	25% Loss
Option 5A	$3 B	$128 B	$272 B	?	?	?	75% Loss
Option 5B	$3 B	$123 B	$268 B	2029	2026	2024	90% Loss
Option 5C	$3 B	$120 B	$256 B	2030	2027	2025	30% Loss
Option 5D	$1 B	$116 B	$239 B	2019	2022	2028	15% Loss

We can draw the following conclusions, which are illustrated in the Graphics mentioned earlier and shown below. We start with Option 1, the Program of Record (POR – Constellation) and the funding level provided in FY 2010:

• Option 1 – Ares I crew vehicle is ready a year after the ISS is de-orbited (2015) and Ares V is completed in 2028 with no funds to conduct exploration. There is no Moon in the picture.
• Option 2 – Scrap Ares I and substitute Commercial Crew Access to LEO. The money saved is used to keep the ISS operating until 2020. Ares V is completed in 2028 with no funds to conduct exploration. There is no Moon in the picture.
• Option 3 – Add $3 Billion per year to the existing program. Ares I crew vehicle is ready a year after the ISS is de-orbited (2015) and Ares V is completed in 2019. The Moon is reached in 2025, but no other destinations beyond LEO can be funded.
• Option 4 – Add $3 Billion per year to the existing program. Scrap Ares I and substitute Commercial Crew Access to LEO. The money saved is used to keep the ISS operating until 2020. Ares V is completed in 2023. The Moon is reached in 2030, but no other destinations beyond LEO can be funded.
• Option 4B – Add $3 Billion per year to the existing program. Extend the Shuttle to 2015. Scrap Ares I and substitute Commercial Crew Access to LEO. The money saved is used to keep the ISS operating until 2020. Ares V is completed in 2023. Develop the Propellant Depot by 2026. The Moon is reached in 2030.
• Option 5A – Add $3 Billion per year to the existing program. Scrap Ares I and substitute Commercial Crew Access to LEO. The money saved is used to keep the ISS operating until 2020. Scrap Ares V in favor of a smaller Ares V Lite, which is completed in 2023. Visit EML-1 or EML-2 in 2026. Visit a Near Earth Object (NEO) Sometime in the Future.
• Option 5B – Add $3 Billion per year to the existing program. Scrap Ares I and substitute Commercial Crew Access to LEO. The money saved is used to keep the ISS operating until 2020. Scrap Ares V in favor of a commercial heavy launch capability, which is completed in 2021. Develop the Propellant Depot by 2024. Visit a Near Earth Object (NEO) in 2026 and Phobos in 2028. Return to the Moon in 2029.
• Option 5C – Add $3 Billion per year to the existing program. Scrap Ares I and substitute Commercial Crew Access to LEO. The money saved is used to keep the ISS operating until 2020. Scrap Ares V in favor of a the Direct Team’s Jupiter 241, which is completed in 2022. Visit EML-1 or EML-2 in 2023. Develop the Propellant Depot by 2024. Visit a Near Earth Object (NEO) in 2027 and Phobos in 2029. Return to the Moon in 2030.

Those are the options explored by the Augustine Commission in their Final Report.

Notice, however, that there is one more slide, Option 5D. This is the architecture that was presented to the Augustine Commission during their first public session on 17 June 2009 by the Direct Team. It provides for:

• Add $1 Billion per year to the existing program.
• Extend Shuttle until 2012.
• Scrap Ares I and develop the Jupiter Core (Jupiter 130) for carrying crew on Orion to LEO and ISS by 2014.
• Develop Commercial Crew Access to LEO to replace the Jupiter 130 by 2015. Use Jupiter 130 for ferrying the few large payloads needed by ISS.
• Continue ISS operations until 2020.
• Scrap Ares V in favor of the Upper Stage for the Jupiter Core (Jupiter 241 or Jupiter 246), which is completed in 2017.
• Visit EML-1 or EML-2 in 2018.
• Orbit the Moon in 2019.
• Visit a Near Earth Object (NEO) in 2022.
• Visit Phobos in 2025.
• Develop the Propellant Depot by 2028.

The key here is that the goal of expansion of human civilization into the Solar System is better served, is accomplished sooner, and costs less. Indeed, even without the additional $1 Billion per year, only the extension of the Shuttle operation need be eliminated.

Final Conclusions

• Options 1, 2 and 3, which are favored by the politicians with space flight facilities, get us nowhere and cost far too much.
• Options 4 and 4B get us to the Moon, but neither builds infrastructure for support of future exploration.
• Options 5A, 5B and 5C builds the skills and infrastructure for space exploration, but leave us a crew to LEO gap of five to six years.
• Option 5D builds the skills and infrastructure for space exploration, reduces the crew to LEO gap to one or two years, and gives the international community the ability to descend to the surface of the Moon and Mars.

Time is of the Essence

Finally, this note about the political realities. First, if a decision is delayed for four to six months while the politicians fight for every last bit of funding they want, the infrastructure on which the Jupiter program builds will be dismantled and Options 4B, 5C and 5D will be eliminated.

Second, Congress will likely decide that the Constellation program as currently envisioned is too costly for what will be developed and not worth throwing more money down the drain. Options 1, 2, 3, 4B and 5A will be eliminated.

Thus, only commercial crew and cargo capabilities will be funded. NASA will be reduced to research and contracting for services. The Marshall Space Flight Facility will have little purpose. And the politicians will lose most of the jobs and funding that their districts currently enjoy.

Special thanks are in order to Philip Metschan for permission to use screen shots of his presentation.

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

The Augustine Commission – Final Report – Hits and Misses – Part 5

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

In Part 1, we looked at the pieces strewn about our living room floor. In Part 2, we examined the Goals and Destinations in Chapter 3.0. And in Part 3, the three current Human Space Flight programs were reviewed (International Space Station, the Space Shuttle and the Constellation Program). In Part 4, we looked at the launch vehicles examined by The Augustine Commission.

Chapter 6 of the Augustine Commission Final Report deals with Program Options and Evaluation. This is one of the many contentious issues commentators have with the Commission. While they did select five possible exploration programs (Chapter 6), and while they did evaluate various launch vehicles (Chapter 5), the Committee seems to have ignored the possibility that different launch vehicles have greater or lesser ability to cover the five exploration programs. This failure may in the end, prove to be disastrous for human space exploration. As we write, the Space Shuttle infrastructure is being actively dismantled. The end result of failing to evaluate the physical infrastructure and the human infrastructure capable of supporting a Shuttle derived architecture may be that the United States is left with no heavy lift human space flight capability for at least the next several decades. We may have surrendered our space faring capability to Europe, China, Russia, India and Japan.

6.1 Evaluation Criteria

As noted by the Commission:

The Committee did not intend that the evaluation would generate a single numerical score; rather, it would provide a basis for comparison across options, highlighting the opportunities and challenges associated with each. Assigning weights to individual figures of merit is within the purview of the ultimate decision-makers.

Three primary evaluation dimensions were identified:

• Benefits to Stakeholders
• Risk
• Budget Realities

These three dimensions were expanded into 12 criteria for comparing the options.

• Exploration Preparation
• Technology Innovation
• Science Knowledge
• Expanding and Protecting Human Civilization
• Economic Expansion
• Global Partnerships
• Public Engagement
• Schedule and Programmatic Risk
• Mission Safety Challenges
• Workforce Impact
• Programmatic Sustainability
• Life-Cycle Cost

6.2 Key Decisions and Integrated Options

6.2.1 Key Decisions

1. What should be the future of the Space Shuttle?
2. What should be the future of the International Space Station (ISS)?
3. On what should the next heavy-lift launch vehicle be based?
4. How should crews be carried to low-Earth orbit?
5. What is the most practicable strategy for exploration beyond low-Earth orbit?

6.2.2 Integrated Options

The Committee identified five basic options: One based on the Program of Record (POR – Constellation – Ares I and V, Orion and Altair), and four alternatives. Options 2 and 3 were budget compatable alternatives to the POR. Option 4 was a Moon First program (with two variations), and Option 5 was the Flexible Path (avoiding the gravity well of the Moon).

6.2.3 Methodology for Analyzing the Integrated Options

Two budgets were used. The “Constrained Budget” used the FY 2010 budget, while the “Less Constrained Budget” allowed for an increase by 2014 of $3 Billion per year higher than FY 2010.

6.2.4 Reference Cases of the Entirely Unconstrained Program of Record

The Program of Record was evaluated and found to be a total of $45 Billion over the FY 2010 budget by 2020, wherein it is $5 Billion a year over FY 2010 in 2016 and $7 Billion per year over FY 2010 in 2019.

6.3 Integrated Options Constrained to the FY 2010 Budget

6.3.1 Evaluation of Integrated Options 1 and 2

Option 1 was found to allow for rocket development, but lacked funds for exploration. Option 2 extends the lifetime of the ISS, delays rocket development, and has no funds for exploration.

6.3.2 Examination of alternate budget guidance

The Committee found no alternatives to Options 1 or 2 that were viable under the FY 2010 budget. This conclusion has been disputed.

6.4 Moon First Integrated Options Fit to the Less-Constrained Budget

6.4.1 Evaluation of Integrated Options 3 and 4

Option 3 was to execute the POR under a less constrained budget. The ISS is de-orbited in 2010, and the Shuttle flies the remaining missions into 2011. Human lunar return occurs in the mid 2020s and the lunar base becomes operation late in the decade. An alternate extending ISS to 2020 was found to push these dates out by three to four more years.

Option 4 uses the less constrained budget, scraps Ares I and substitutes commercial crew services by 2016 It extends the ISS to 2020. Ares V is scrapped in favor of a dual-launch Ares V Lite vehicle for lunar missions.

Option 4A retires the Shuttle in 2011, while Option 4B extends the Shuttle to 2015 and develops a Shuttle Derived Heavy Lift vehicle in place of Ares V Lite.

6.4.2 Examination of the key decision on the ISS extension

Given the International Partnerships that have been developed, and the fact that the extension to 2020 would only delay the lunar return by a few years, the Committee found that the extension provides greater value than ending the ISS mission.

6.4.3 Examination of the key decision on Ares V vs. Ares V Lite dual launch

Baseline Ares V has more launch capability than the Saturn V, but current NASA studies show that when used in combination with Ares I, it does not have enough launch capability to robustly deliver the currently planned landing and surface systems to the Moon.

The Committee concluded that Ares V Lite represents less development risk, likely will reduce costs and provides more substantial margin for the lunar mission.

6.4.4 Examination of the key decision on the provision of crew transport to low-Earth orbit

Commercial crew services, based on a high-reliability rocket with a capsule and launch escape system could significantly reduce development costs, as well as lower operating costs.

6.4.5 Examination of the key question on Shuttle extension

The Committee favored early retirement of the Shuttle (2010 or 2011), although they noted several advantages to Shuttle extension to 2015, including up-mass and down-mass capability and workforce retention.

6.5 Flexible Path Integrated Options Fit to the Less-Constrained Budget

6.5.1 Evaluation of Integrated Option 5

Option 5 operates the Shuttle into 2011 and extends the International Space Station mission until 2020. A variety of destinations beyond low earth orbit are possible. The Committee developed three variants of this option.

• Option 5A develops the Ares V Lite, visits the Lagrange points, near Earth objects, on-orbit refueling and achieves a lunar return by the end of the 2020s.
• Option 5B develops commercial heavy lift capability, restructures NASA, and follows a similar mission profile as 5A, but on a slower time line.
• Option 5C scraps Ares V Lite and develops a Shuttle Derived Heavy Lift vehicle. 5C follows a similar mission profile as 5A, but on a slower time line.

6.5.2 Examination of the key question on Ares V family vs. Shuttle-derived heavy launcher

While the Shuttle derived in-line launch vehicle (SDLV) with two four-segment solid rocket motors (SRM) and the 8.4 meter external tank (ET) was the 2005 ESAS candidate for the cargo vehicle, it was forced to evolve into the Ares V due to the problems encountered with the underpowered Ares I. For some reason, the Committee decided that in order to match the capabilities of the Ares V, or the Ares V Lite dual-launch mission, that there had to be three SDLV launches. Therefore, operations would be more costly.

This is a clear Committee miss, as the current planned lunar return missions can be accomplished with good margin by a dual-launch SDLV program, thus costing less than the Ares V Lite. There is no need for the enhanced capabilities of the dual-launch Ares V Lite.

6.5.3 Examination of the key question on NASA heritage vs. EELV-heritage super-heavy vehicles

The Committee considers the EELV-heritage super-heavy vehicle to be a way to significantly reduce the operating cost of the heavy lifter to NASA in the long run. It would be a less-capable vehicle, but probably sufficiently capable for the mission. Reaping the long-term cost benefits would require substantial disruption in NASA, and force the agency to adopt a new way of doing business.

6.6 Comparisons Across Integrated Options

6.6.1 Cross-option comparisons

The Flexible Path program (Option 5A) scores more highly than the Baseline (Option 3) on 9 of the 12 criteria outlined in section 6.1 ( See figure 6.6.1-1). The higher rankings include:

• Exploration Preparation (due to much more capable launch system)
• Technology (due to investment in technology)
• Science (because of more places visited)
• Human Civilization (due to the ISS extension)
• Economic Expansion (because of commercial involvement in space elements and crew transport)
• Global Partnerships (gained by extending the ISS)
• Public Engagement (by visiting more new locations, and doing so each year)
• Schedule (exploring beyond low-Earth orbit sooner)
• Life-Cycle Costs (due to commercial crew services)

6.6.2 Examination of the key question on exploration strategy

Three exploration strategies were examined in Chapter 3. The choice of Mars First was found not to be viable due to technological problems. Two strategies remained:

• Moon First on the Way to Mars, with surface exploration focused on developing capability for Mars.
• Flexible Path to Mars via the inner solar system objects and locations, with no immediate plan for surface exploration, then followed by exploration of the lunar and/or Martian surface.

The Moon first is favorable to lunar science and exploration (although much can be done robotically). The Flexible Path missions explore more of the Solar System, while initially doing less on the Moon. Flexible Path has the advantage of developing infrastructure for deep space exploration, including the moons of Mars and Mars itself. The Committe notes that:

Considering that we have visited and obtained samples from the Moon, but not near-Earth objects or Mars, and also that the Flexible Path develops the ability to service space observatories, the Science Knowledge criterion slightly favors the Flexible Path. Broadly, the more complex the environment, the more astronaut explorers are favored over robotic exploration. In practice, this means that astronauts will offer their greatest value-added in the exploration of the surface of Mars.

Final Scoring

Although the Augustine Commission did not publish a final tally of the scores (for reasons they made clear), the following table does compare and tabulate the scores.

Option	Description	Science	Safety	Cost	Schedule	NASA / Industry Jobs	US Skills Retention	Exploration Capability	Technology	Space Colony Potential	Commercial Benefit	Public Engagement	international Cooperation	Sustainability	Total
1	The Status Quo	0	0	0	-2	-1	-1	-2	-2	-2	-1	-1	-2	-1	-15
2	ISS Extension plus Moon	0	0	1	-2	-1	-1	-2	1	-1	1	-1	0	0	-5
3	Status quo + $3 B	1	-1	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-2	0	-3
4	Shuttle + Moon	1	-1	1	0	0	-1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	4
4B	Shuttle 2015 + Moon	1	-1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	5
5A	Flexible Path + Ares Lite	2	-1	1	1	0	-1	2	1	1	2	1	0	0	9
5B	Flexible Path + Commercial	2	-2	2	1	0	-1	1	2	1	2	1	0	-1	8
5C	Flexible Path + Jupiter 241	2	-2	0	1	0	-1	1	1	1	2	1	0	1	7

Option 5D: We will have more to say about this proposal in our final segment: “Wrapped Up” or “The Augustine Commission for Dummies”.

Option	Description	Science	Safety	Cost	Schedule	NASA / Industry Jobs	US Skills Retention	Exploration Capability	Technology	Space Colony Potential	Commercial Benefit	Public Engagement	international Cooperation	Sustainability	Total
5D	Flexible Path + Direct	2	-2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	13

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

The Augustine Commission – Final Report – Hits and Misses – Part 4

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

In Part 1, we looked at the pieces strewn about our living room floor. In Part 2, we examined the Goals and Destinations in Chapter 3.0. And in Part 3, the three current Human Space Flight programs were reviewed (International Space Station, the Space Shuttle and the Constellation Program).

Chapter 5.0 Launch to Low-Earth Orbit and Beyond

In this section, The Augustine Commission examines launch vehicles. We begin with the opening statement, with which we agree:

Launch to low-Earth orbit is the most energy-intensive and dynamic step in human space exploration. No other single propulsive maneuver, including descent to and ascent from the surfaces of the Moon or Mars, demands higher thrust or more energy or has the high aerodynamic pressure forces than a launch from Earth. Launch is a critical area for spaceflight, and two of the five key questions that guide the future plans for U.S. human spaceflight focus on launch to low-Earth orbit: the delivery of heavy masses to low-Earth orbit and beyond; and the delivery of crew to low-Earth orbit.

5.1 Evaluation methodologies for Launch Vehicles

The Commission used “cost, performance and schedule parameters, as well as safety, operability, maturity, human rating, workforce implications, development of commercial space, the consequences to national security space, and the impact on exploration and science missions”. They note that some of these are quantitative and some are qualitative measures. Evaluations of the claim for each launcher was made and adjusted, and the uncertainty was assessed. Historical bounds were employed where appropriate. Some 70 lower-level metrics were used to construct 13 top level metrics.

5.2 Heavy Lift to Low-Earth Orbit and Beyond

The Commission began by reiterating the Constellation plan to loft about 600 metric tons (mt) per year to low Earth orbit (LEO). By comparison, NASA launched 250 mt per year during Apollo and the International Space Station (ISS) has a mass of about 350 mt.

Figure 5.2-1 listed the five candidates and their lift to LEO (see Launch Vehicles for visuals) and Figure 5.2.1-1 gave Trans Lunar Injection (TLI) with no refueling and with in-space refueling:



Launch Vehicle	LEO	TLI no refueling	TLI in-space refueling
EELV Super Heavy	75 mt	26 mt	55 mt
Directly Shuttle Derived	100-110 mt	35 mt	75 mt
Ares V Lite	140 mt	55 mt	120 mt
Ares V	160 mt	63 mt	130 mt
Ares V plus Ares I	185 mt	71 mt	150 mt

Notice that the Commission has brought the potential of in-space refueling front and center, either as propellant transfer from one spacecraft to another (as in a dual launch Ares V Lite or Jupiter 246), or from a true propellant depot, which would be supplied by commercial contract. However, “the Committee found both of these concepts feasible with current technology, but in need of significant further engineering development and in-space demonstration before they could be included in a baseline design”. Thus, the initial set of evaluations would need to examine the mass that an Earth Departure Stage (EDS) could push through TLI without refueling.

A detailed study of launch reliability of multi-launch missions commissioned by the Committee concluded that at most three critical launches be used. Reasonable chances for success required 90+ days of on-orbit life for an EDS or propellant depots.

Subsequent to Shuttle retirement, the need for NASA to launch 400 to 600 mt to LEO each year would consume much if not all of the existing and planned excess EELV capacity. Further, it would be expensive.

Finally, the Commission notes that heavy lift vehicles “would allow large scientific observatories to be launched, potentially enabling them to have optics larger than the current five-meter fairing sizes will allow. More capable deep-space science missions could be mounted, allowing faster or more extensive exploration of the outer solar system”.

All the foregoing was seen as justification for the development of Heavy Lift vehicles. The Commission then reviewed the choices in the chart above.

Ares V: This is the most capable of the proposed rockets. Together with the Ares I, it can launch 185 mt to LEO, 71 mt through TLI and land 14 tons of cargo only on the lunar surface, or 2 mt of cargo plus crew. Ares V requires expansion of the External Tank (ET) to 10 meters, the development of new 5.5 segment solid rocket motors (SRM), development of a regenerative version of the RS-68 engine and the development of the J2-X second stage engine (modified from the Saturn J2 engine).

Ares V Lite: Ares V Lite is a derivative of the Ares V, but with an LEO payload of 140 mt. This rocket would require the completion of the 5 segment SRM under development for Ares I. The remaining new Ares V components would still require development. For lunar missions, the Ares V Lite would be human-rated and used in the “dual mode”. In single launch it can place 14 mt of cargo on the lunar surface, and with a larger Lander than Ares V, it can land 5 mt of cargo plus crew.

SDLV Side-Mount: The side-mount and the in-line SDLV both use the existing Space Shuttle ET, the 4 segment SRM and the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME). The side-mount replaces the Shuttle with a cargo pod. The Committee combined the side-mount with the in-line variants for purposes of evaluation. They did note, however, that “the side-mount variant is considered an inherently less safe arrangement if crew are to be carried, and is more limited in its growth potential”.

SDLV In-Line The in-line variants are represented by the Jupiter family of rockets, as proposed by the Direct team. The Committee assumed that three Jupiter 241 vehicles would be used for a lunar mission, and that 5 mt of cargo could be landed with crew. No figure was given for a cargo only dual-launch mission, but the report states that more than 20 mt of cargo can be landed by a single Jupiter 241 using in-space refueling. Now, the three launch scenario is peculiar. Perhaps the Commission was trying to replicate the LEO loft mass of a dual Ares V Lite mission (2 x 140 mt). However, that much fuel, lander and crew far exceeds the Constellation Program (CxP) requirements. Furthermore, Ross Tierney, from Direct, has stated that “the right 2-launch Jupiter architecture is actually capable of landing 19mT of useful payload mass on the lunar surface every crew mission…Given that the Ascent Module only consists of about 6.4mT of that, this architecture is actually capable of landing almost the same 14.5mT* cargo modules as CxP are currently planning to land using cargo-only missions”. So we are left with unanswered questions concerning the assumptions and evaluations made by the Commission, not only about SDLV, but the Ares mission architectures.

EELV Super Heavy The Extended Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) is represented by the Atlas 5 Phase 2 Heavy, which consists of the core rocket plus two boosters of the same basic design along with an upgraded common upper stage (to be used by both Atlas and Delta). The common upper stage would use four RL-10 rocket engines, which have a long history of successful flights aboard Titan, Delta and Atlas among others. This configuration is capable of lofting a maximum of 75 mt to LEO. A dual launch configuration with in-space refueling is capable of conducting Flexible Path missions.

Summary of Findings

• Heavy Lift capability is beneficial to human exploration as well as national security and the scientific community.
• In-Space refueling represents a significant benefit to space transportation systems beyond low Earth orbit. It requires development and would not be on the critical path. A prudent approach is to develop Heavy Lift capable of early missions and phase in in-space refueling when it becomes available.
• A new emphasis of sustainable operations is needed. “NASA’s design culture emphasizes maximizing performance at minimum development cost, repeatedly resulting in high operational and lifecycle costs. A shift in NASA design culture toward design for minimum discounted life-cycle cost, accompanied by robustness and adequate margins, will allow NASA programs to be more sustainable”.
• In-Space Propulsion for missions beyond LEO that last for weeks or months require stages using efficient engines with high-reliability restart capabilities.

The Lunar Surface Capabilities of the various systems are compared in the following table:



Launch Vehicle	LEO	Cargo Only	Cargo and Crew
EELV Super Heavy	75 mt	NA mt	NA mt
Directly Shuttle Derived	100-110 mt	14 mt*	5 mt*
Ares V Lite	140 mt	14 mt	5 mt
Ares V plus Ares I	185 mt	14 mt	2 mt

5.3 Crew Launch to Low-Earth Orbit

Crew safety is an overriding issue in human space flight. The safe delivery of crew to LEO and their return is critical. This is the fourth key question (see Part 1) that the Committee examined. The assumed that Orion would be the crew vehicle, and that the launch vehicle would either be government provided and operated, or a commercial service.

Ares I was selected in 2005 as part of the ESAS study, and was expected to be operational in 2012. The Constellation program now projects initial operational capability (IOC) in 2015, and the Committee thinks this will slip further. Both budgetary and design problems have been encountered.

International Transportation was deemed acceptable by the Committee. However, sustained U. S. leadership in space requires domestic crew launch capability.

A human rated EELV was considered by the Commission. An independent study found that the launch of Orion on the Delta IV Heavy was technically feasible, but the long term development and carrying costs offset any savings versus Ares I.

Commercial Transport of crew to LEO is a hot topic. The Committee asked “can a simple capsule with a launch escape system, operating on a high-reliability liquid booster, be made safer than the Shuttle, and comparably as safe as Ares I plus Orion”? A number of factors were considered:

• A strong role for NASA oversight of the development would be required.
• The cost to NASA of underwriting design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E).
• The potential non-NASA uses of LEO crew transport

The Committee made several estimates of total costs, and arrived at a preliminary estimate of $5 Billion dollars. Assuming a “less-constrained” NASA budget, a commercial LEO crew transport service could be available by 2016.

Finally, the Committee assessed the risks to the human space flight program associated with commercial crew transport. Such development could distract from the near-term goal of developing commercial cargo capability. The commercial community might fail to deliver a crew transportation system. The fall-back position for NASA would be human rating the Heavy Lift Vehicle. The Committee assumes that the first stage of the HLV will be developed as quickly as possible. We leave the implications of this statement as an exercise for the reader.

5.4 Additional Issues in Launcher Selection

Launch Vehicle Performance and Costing The factors in this section include:

• Evaluation of the claimed cost, schedule and performance of the various launch vehicles.
• The advantage of shifting to commercial purchase of space transportation systems.
• The loss of the workforce and expertise built up within NASA from shifting to commercial sources.
• The health and viability of the solid rocket motor industry from all-liquid fuel launch vehicles.

Launcher Reliability The Committee reviewed the historical reliability of the Shuttle, Saturn, Titan, Delta and Atlas programs. Launchers derived from existing systems have shown greater reliability in early stages of development than newly developed systems.

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

The Augustine Commission – Final Report – Hits and Misses – Part 3

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

In Part 1, we looked at the pieces strewn about our living room floor. In Part 2, we examined the Goals and Destinations in Chapter 3.0.

Chapter 4.0 Current Human Spaceflight Programs

The current U.S. human spaceflight programs are the operational Space Shuttle Program and the U.S. portion of the International Space Station (ISS). The next human spaceflight effort, the Constellation Program, is in development.

4.1 The Space Shuttle

The Commission reviewed long history of the Space Shuttle, its two fatal accidents, and the increasing complexity of missions, especially those since the return to flight in 2005. Early missions were 4 to 7 days and rarely involved a space walk. Current missions are 13 to 14 days and have involved as many as 5 space walks. The Hubble repair mission is typical.

The Shuttle was scheduled for retirement in 2010, and the replacement vehicle was scheduled to arrive in 2012. After four years of development, the Constellation Program does not expect this replacement vehicle to arrive before 2016, at the earliest. Currently, the time between Shuttle missions is averaging 100 days. With six missions remaining, the schedule calls for completion in 2010, an average of only 64 days between flights. The schedule would extend into the middle of 2011 if current prudent safety practices are maintained.

The Committee explored three scenarios for the Shuttle:

• Scenario 1: Prudent Shuttle Fly-Out. As noted, the current Shuttle schedule has little or no margin remaining. Scenario 1 is a likely reflection of reality. It restores margin to the schedule, at a flight rate in line with recent experience, and allocates funds in FY 2011 to support Shuttle operations into that fiscal year. Based on historical data, the Committee believes it is likely that the remaining six flights on the manifest will stretch into the second quarter of 2011, and it is prudent to plan for that occurrence and explicitly include the associated costs in the FY 2011 budget.
• Scenario 2: Short-Term Support for the ISS. Space Shuttle retirement will have an impact on the ISS (described more fully in a subsequent section). Scenario 2 would add one additional Shuttle flight to provide some additional support for the ISS and ease the transition to commercial and international cargo flights. It could enhance early utilization of the ISS, offer an opportunity for providing more spare parts, and enable scientific experiments to be brought back to Earth. This additional Shuttle flight would not replace any of the planned international or commercial resupply flights.
• Scenario 3: Extend Shuttle to 2015 at Minimum Flight Rate. This scenario would extend the Shuttle at a minimum safe flight rate (nominally two flights per year) into FY 2015. Once the Shuttle is retired, the U.S. itself will no longer have the ability to launch astronauts into space, and will have to rely on the Russian Soyuz vehicle. That gap will persist until a new vehicle becomes available to transport crew to low-Earth orbit. Under the current program, the resulting gap is expected to be seven years or more. This scenario, if combined with a new crew launch capability that will be available by the middle of the 2010s, significantly reduces that gap, and retains U.S. ability to deliver astronauts to the ISS.

While the Commission strongly leans toward scenario 1, it acknowledges good reasons for scenario 3, since American access to the International Space Station (ISS) and material support of the ISS are very important.

4.2 The International Space Station

Construction of the International Space Station was begun in 1998 and was scheduled to be completed with an aggressive Shuttle schedule. The Columbia accident suspended construction, and Russia kept the ISS alive until the Shuttle returned in 2005. Construction was slowed by the prudent flight rate and the ISS was completed this year. It is scheduled to be decommissioned in 2015, and splashed into the Pacific Ocean.

It is now acknowledged that such a course would shred the current International Partnership involving the ISS. Further, retirement of the Shuttle puts the ISS on fragile footing with regard to supply and maintenance.

The Commission entertained three scenarios:

• Scenario 1: End U.S. Participation in the ISS at the end of 2015.
• Scenario 2: Continue ISS Operations at the Present Level to 2020.
• Scenario 3: Enrich the ISS Program and Extend through 2020.

Scenario 1 was rejected. Scenario 2 keeps the ISS alive for use by the international community, but does “not allow the ISS to achieve its full potential as a National Laboratory or as a technology testbed. The majority of the funding is devoted to sustaining basic operations and providing transportation”.

With Scenario 3, the Commission provides discussion and insight into the importance of additional funding associated with the extension of the ISS mission. Two quotes illustrate this:

The National Research Council Space Studies Board has recently initiated a decadal survey of life and microgravity science that will identify key scientific issues and strategies for addressing them. This is the first decadal survey in this area, and it will bring the most modern scientific understanding to bear on what questions may be answered in the decade through 2020

The Committee believes that the Space Station can be a valuable testbed for the life support, environmental, and advanced propulsion technologies, among others, that will be needed to send humans on missions farther into space. It also has the potential to help develop operational techniques important to exploration.

Having examined two active human space flight programs, the Committee waded into the thorny world of the Briar Patch.

4.3 The Constellation Program

The Constellation Program consists of the Orion crew exploration vehicle (CEV), the Ares I crew launch rocket, the Ares V cargo launch rocket and the Altair Lunar surface access module (LSAM).

The Orion was originally designed to field a crew of six for missions as long as six months, with a service module and launch abort system (LAS). Due to reduced capabilities anticipated for the Ares I, the Orion is facing continuing design changes, reducing its capacity to four crew, and requiring other design compromises. The report concludes that:

When compared to historical programs, the most likely delay to the Orion availability approaches 18 months. Additional critical paths exist through ground test and flight test.

At this point, the report examines the historical record and the mismatch between program contend and funding (see Figure 4.3.2-1. Constellation Program Funding Profiles. Source: NASA, p. 59):

• ESAS original funding was scheduled to rise from $4.5 Billion in 2009 to $10.0 Billion in 2017.
• Fiscal Year 2009 budget was to rise from $3.3 Billion to $8.3 Billion by 2017.
• Fiscal Year 2010 budget rises from $2.9 Billion to $6.8 Billion in 2017.

These cuts have severely hampered the Constellation Program. This is a 45% reduction in budget in 2009 from the ESAS budget voted by Congress to the actual appropriated amount, and a 32% reduction by 2017. Congress and the previous administration are to blame for failing to fulfill their promises (what’s new?), and NASA is to blame for believing the unfunded promises of the politicians. Plenty of rope to hang everybody.

The next target of the Commission is the Ares V (about which much will be said later). To quote the report, “The Ares V, still in conceptual design, promises to be an extremely capable rocket—able to lift 160 metric tons of cargo into low-Earth orbit”. Now this classification of Ares V is interesting, because as we have previously noted, the Program of Record (PoR – Constellation; see CxP 70000 Constellation Architecture Requirements Document (CARD) Rev 3 Change 001, March 2009), requires that 71.1 mt of cargo be sent to the Moon (“the lander must mass no more than 45,000kg, Orion mass 20,185kg, ASE mass 890kg and there is 5,000kg of Manager’s Margin included for safety. That’s a grand total of 71,075kg or 71.1mT of total spacecraft mass being pushed thru TLI”). This is one of the “Misses” that the Commission makes. Instead of scoring proposed architectures by the requirements of the program proposed to justify the architecture, scoring seems to have been done against an architecture, absent the program. One wonders why Ares V needs to be so big.

Altair is by-passed in this chapter with a reference back to chapter 3.0. Subsequent to the release of the Commission’s report, development of Altair has been suspended, pending decisions by the current administration.

Finally, the Committee deals gingerly with Ares I:

The Ares I is currently dealing with technical problems of a character not remarkable in the design of a complex system – problems that should be resolvable with commensurate cost and schedule impacts. Its ultimate utility is diminished by schedule delays, which cause a mismatch with the programs it is intended to serve.

We are left, therefore, with hits and misses so far. Hits include the Goal. Also, the value of the Shuttle for up-mass and down-mass in the support of the ISS. Furthermore, the potential value of the ISS for scientific research, international cooperation, space based construction and maintenance, technological testing and human factor research.

Misses focus around the arbitrary choice of hardware capability without regard to Goal or mission.

Part 4 next.

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

The Augustine Commission – Final Report – Hits and Misses – Part 2

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

In Part 1, we looked at the pieces strewn about our living room floor. Let’s take a closer look at the Erector Set left behind by the Augustine Commission. The pieces parts are contained in Chapters 3-6.

Chapter 3.0 Goals and Future Destinations for Exploration

Most discussions concerning the Final Report have noted the importance of the having a Goal established in order to define both destinations and architectures to achieve them. Lets start with this extended quote from the Final Report:

3.1 Goals for Exploration

We explore to reach goals, not destinations. It is in the definition of our goals that decision-making for human spaceflight should begin. With goals established, questions about destinations, exploration strategies and transportation architectures can follow in a logical order. While there are certainly some aspects of the transportation system that are common to all exploration missions (e.g. crew access and heavy lift to low-Earth orbit), there is a danger of choosing destinations and architectures first. This runs the risk of getting stuck at a destination without a clear understanding of why it was chosen, which in turn can lead to uncertainty about when it is time to move on.

One can certainly agree with the rationale for starting with Goals. However, the final phrase leads one to pause. Does the expression “when it is time to move on” mean that we abandon destinations along the path toward our Goals? Rather, does it mean that we add what’s next to our collection of destinations when we have gained the required competence and experience from work on the most recent addition to our expanding list of destinations? We shall keep these questions in mind as we work through Chapter 3.

The Commission set “charting a path for human expansion into the solar system” as the Goal. The Commission sees the development of competitive commercial industries and important national capabilities as one reason for setting the Goal they did. It also cited the resulting scientific, technological, engineering and mathematical skills as another reason for choosing this Goal. Finally, the moment when we “first learn to live on another planet” will be a milestone in human history.

3.2 Overview of Destinations and Approach

Destinations can be classified by duration of the mission: the Moon is days away, the Lagrange points weeks, the near-Earth objects months, a Mars fly-by a year, and a Mars landing is the longest—about 900 days for a round trip using the most likely approach. The result of two cycles of analyses collapsed the destinations and associated missions into three candidates:

• Mars First. It is widely accepted that Mars represents the most likely candidate for a permanent expansion of human civilization beyond the Earth. Mars is unquestionably the most complex environment for exploration, and fits Dr. Steve Squyres criteria for deploying human investigators.
• Moon First. Missions to the Moon would enable the development of the operational skills and technology for landing on, launching from and working on a planetary surface.
• Flexible Path. The Commission notes that the Flexible Path option means “we must learn to operate in free space for hundreds of days, beyond the protective radiation belts of the Earth, before we can confidently commit to exploring Mars”.

The Final Report then examines each of these options.

3.3 Mars First

The possible scenarios for Mars First are two, described by the Commission this way:

Two scenarios have been developed to examine the human exploration of Mars. In the first, the surface of Mars would be the initial and only destination, and all resources would be focused on reaching it as soon as possible. In the second, systems would be designed for Mars missions, but would be first verified on several test flights to the Moon. The latter would require some hardware modification, but would test the systems at a planetary body near the Earth before committing to a multi-year mission to Mars. In the end, the Committee decided to use the variant with a brief test flight program of equipment and procedures on the Moon as the reference Mars First option.

The first scenario was analyzed based on the existing 2007 NASA Human Exploration of Mars Design Reference Architecture 5.0 (NASA-SP-2009-566 and NASA-SP-2009-566-ADD). This architecture is shown in Figure 3.3.2-1 (p. 36). Figure 3.3.2-2 shows the architecture of first conducting several missions to the Moon.

The Commission concluded that the technological problems were many, and that a decade of research was required before design work could commence. Further, the costs were significantly higher than for either of the other two options.

Clearly, either of the possible scenarios leaves little or no infrastructure in place, and fails the Goals criteria.

3.4 Moon First

The Commission next examined the Moon First. Here, the possibility of resource utilization for supplying propellant to the space around the Earth-Moon system, as well as the scientific value of exploration based on our incomplete understanding of the Moon drive two possible scenarios. The first is a Lunar Base, where a permanent station is established, most likely at the South Pole where solar energy would be available at all times. The emphasis would be on local exploration and resource utilization for propellant manufacture.

The alternate scenario was Lunar Global, where missions of from 14 to 180 days would be flown to a variety of sites, adjusting the program as discoveries were made.

Either of these programs would be supported by one of three architectures considered by the Committee:

• Constellation “1.5 launch” architecture – one Ares I with Orion, plus one Ares V with the Altair lander. This combination is Integrated Option 3 in Chapter 6.
• Ares V Lite “dual” architecture – two Ares V Lites, one with the Orion, and one with the Altair lander. This combination is Integrated Option 4A in Chapter 6.
• A more directly Shuttle-derived launcher, which requires three launches for a crew mission plus one commercial launch of crew to low-Earth orbit. This combination is Integrated Option 4B in Chapter 6.

One is immediately struck by two contradictions within these architectures. First is the requirement for three launches for the more directly Shuttle-derived launcher, when two launches of the Jupiter 246 exceed the Constellation Program requirements. See this data sheet for the Jupiter 130 Crew and Cargo (60 mt to low earth orbit) and data sheet for the Jupiter 246 Crew and Cargo launcher (96 mt to LEO and 79 mt through TLI).

The second more serious contradiction is allowing Ares V Lite to launch crew, but requiring the Shuttle-derived vehicle to only carry cargo. The problem we face is that Ares V Lite has:

• New Engines
• New External Tank (10 meters)
• New Solid Rocket Boosters (5 segment)

Each of these requires independent rating for human flight. On the other hand, both the side-mount Shuttle-derived launch vehicle and the in-line Shuttle-derived vehicle have:

• Existing SSME (Space Shuttle Main Engines)
• Existing External Tank (8.4 meters)
• Existing 4 segment Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB)

The SSMEs and the 4 segment SRBs are already human flight qualified. The modifications to the ET would require flight testing for qualification of the in-line vehicle, but are minor compare to designing and building a brand new 10 meter tank. While the side-mount Shuttle-derived launch vehicle has disadvantages for launching crew, the in-line Shuttle-derived vehicle has no such drawbacks.

These contradictions place unwarranted obstacles on the Shuttle-derived vehicles, especially the in-line version.

3.5 The Flexible Path to Mars

The Commission states:

“The goal is to take steps toward Mars, learning to live and work in free space and near planets, under the conditions humans will meet on
the way to Mars. We must learn to operate in free space for hundreds of days, beyond the protective radiation belts of the Earth, before we can confidently commit to exploring Mars.

The primary attraction of this option is that we can build increasing confidence, infrastructure and expertise as we move from one destination to the next.

There are multiple destinations. Each one offers the opportunity to build different skills. Especially valuable would be for international partners to take on the challenge of Lunar Surface Exploration while NASA continues the research and development required for the Flexible Path missions. Both commercial enterprises and International Partners could handle the propellant delivery to the depots in LEO, EML-2, and eventually Phobos. All of this is aimed at the eventual establishment of permanent human presence on Mars.

From the perspective of the Goals given by the Commission, the Flexible Path option is the strongest.

3.6 Summary of Strategies for Exploration Beyond Low-Earth Orbit

The Committee concludes as follows:

Mars is the ultimate destination for human exploration of the inner solar system; but it is not the best first destination. Both visiting the Moon First and following the Flexible Path are viable exploration strategies. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive; before traveling to Mars, we might be well served to both extend our presence in free space and gain experience working on the lunar surface.

In the next post, we will look at the existing human space flight programs discussed in Chapter 4.0.

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

The Augustine Commission – Final Report – Hits and Misses – Part 1

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

The final report from the Augustine Commission is out. And while the report suffers from the 90 day time constraint, what it does do is open the discussion of what we are doing in space. The answer the Commission gives is to “Expand Human Civilization into the Solar System”. Having given that answer, however, the report then goes back to its origins and begins its “Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans”.

Starting Points

Following some initial public meetings, the Committee decided that it should answer the following questions:

• 1. What should be the future of the Space Shuttle?
• 2. What should be the future of the International Space Station (ISS)?
• 3. On what should the next heavy-lift launch vehicle be based?
• 4. How should crews be carried to low-Earth orbit?
• 5. What is the most practicable strategy for exploration beyond low-Earth orbit?

The report then details how the Commission arrived at the potential programs that were evaluated. Starting with a matrix of over 3,000 possible combinations of destinations, hardware and missions based on the five questions, the Committee developed five options, which were explored and evaluated. Several of them had alternatives. The options are:

• Option 1. Program of Record as Assessed by the Committee, Constrained to the FY 2010 budget, providing funds for the Shuttle into FY 2011 and including sufficient funds to deorbit the ISS in 2016.
• Option 2. ISS and Lunar Exploration, Constrained to FY 2010 Budget. It extends the ISS to 2020, and begins a program of lunar exploration using a derivative of Ares V, referred to here as the Ares V Lite.
• Option 3. Baseline Case—Implementable Program of Record. This is an executable version of the Program of Record. Budgeting for the completion of remaining flights on the Shuttle manifest in 2011 and including additional funds for the de-orbit of the ISS.
• Option 4. Moon First. It consists of the content and sequence of that program–de-orbiting the ISS in 2016, developing Orion, Ares I and Ares V, and beginning exploration of the Moon using the Altair lander and lunar surface systems
• Variant 4A is the Ares V Lite variant. This option retires the Shuttle in FY 2011 and develops the Ares V Lite heavy-lift launcher for lunar xploration.
• Variant 4B is the Shuttle extension variant. It offers the only foreseeable way to eliminate the gap in U.S. human-launch capability: by extending
  the Shuttle to 2015 at a minimum safe-flight rate.
• Option 5. Flexible Path. It operates the Shuttle into FY 2011, extends the ISS until 2020. The destinations include Near Earth Objects, the Lagrange points around the Earth-Moon system and the moons of Mars.
• Variant 5A is the Ares V Lite variant. It develops the Ares V Lite, the most capable of the heavy-lift vehicles in this option.
• Variant 5B employs an EELV-heritage commercial heavy-lift launcher and assumes a different (and significantly reduced) role for NASA. It has an advantage of potentially lower operational costs, but requires significant restructuring of NASA.
• Variant 5C uses a Shuttle-derived, heavy-lift vehicle, taking maximum advantage of existing infrastructure, facilities and production capabilities.

It is at this point that Chapter 1.0 Summary ends.

Interlude

Chapter 2.0 U.S. Human Spaceflight: Historical Review offers a brief four page summary of the past 50 years.

Boring Details

Having laid out the summary questions and options, the report then elaborates with detailed work as follows:

• Chapter 3.0 Goals and Future Destinations for Exploration
• Chapter 4.0 Current Human Spaceflight Programs
• Chapter 5.0 Launch to Low-Earth Orbit and Beyond
• Chapter 6.0 Program Options and Evaluation

These are interesting chapters with lots of studies, trades, costs, schedules and contradictions destined to engage the various factions concerned with human space flight for a long time. We will return here in future posts to engage some of these arcane turf wars.

Problems Requiring Solutions

In the mean time, Chapter 7.0 Critical Technologies for Sustainable Exploration, has the significant factors required to eventually come to grips with a real vision for space exploration.

7.1 Fundamental Unknowns lists these three key problems:

• (1) the effects of prolonged exposure to solar and galactic cosmic rays on the human body
• (2) the impact on humans of prolonged periods of weightlessness followed by a sudden need to function, without assistance, in a relatively strong gravitational field
• (3) the psychological effects on individuals facing demanding tasks in extreme isolation for well over year with no possibility for direct outside human intervention.

7.2 Propellant Storage and Transfer in Space discusses the advantages of refueling rockets in space. The traditional mission involves launching your Moon rocket and payload and all the propellant needed to leave Earth orbit and land on the Moon. Not a lot of cargo gets landed on the Moon because most of the payload is propellant.

However, if you launch your Moon rocket and it arrives empty at the propellant depot, you can add propellant. Since you don’t have propellant in the rocket, the mass of the rocket and cargo constitutes the entire payload. This means a lot more cargo gets to the Moon.

7.3 In Situ Propellant Production and Transport involves using the resources from objects in the Solar System to produce propellant. These bodies include the Moon, Mars, asteroids and comets.

7.4 Mars Orbit to Surface Transportation. Quoting from the report:

“The entry, descent and landing of cargo on Mars is difficult because Mars has sufficient atmosphere to drive the design of landing systems, but inadequate atmosphere for feasible parachutes or wings to safely land astronauts on the surface. Scientific probes landing on Mars have used a complex mix of aerodynamic braking and rocket propulsion. These techniques will have to be improved before larger robotic or crewed missions can be sent to Mars. This research and technology development program needs to be started soon, because it will require many iterations and increasingly larger missions before NASA is ready to demonstrate a safe, crewed Mars landing. Meanwhile, the intermediate results would greatly benefit future robotic missions.”

7.5 Advanced Space Propulsion include solar and nuclear powered systems.

7.6 Technology Summary provides two charts covering a large number of items:

• Figure 7.6-1. Technology opportunities to impact near- and mid-term exploration capabilities and sustainability.
• Figure 7.6-2. Technology opportunities impact longer-term capabilities and sustainability.

International Partners

Chapter 8.0 Partnerships covers the advantages and problems associated with partnerships, both International and intra-governmental, such as Department of Defense and national security interests.

What Are We To Do

The final report of the Augustine Commission ends with a series of concluding remarks and recommendations about costs, goals and management.

And we are left with the sense that something is missing.

We have a lot of pieces spread out on the floor in front of us. There are snippets of vision laying here and there. What are we to do with it all?

Let us try and bring about some order:

• What gets decided in the next 6 months is likely to affect the next hundred years of exploration.
• We have a lot of technological problems to solve, so we are not going to go as fast as everybody wants to go.
• Building in small steps and becoming good at each step means we can develop a robust infrastructure. Building the International Space Stations has taught us a lot of lessons about how to do things in space, as well as how not to do things.
• It will take more wealth than the American taxpayer can afford. The tasks require a concerted continuation by the rest of the nations in the efforts already underway.
• A sustained and sustainable program will have to learn to live off the land. The less we have to bring with us, the less we have to bring with us (getting mass up out of the Earth’s gravity well is very expensive).

The worst thing would be to make a mad dash to Mars, send pictures back of astronauts saluting the flag, and leaving nothing behind (except footprints).

No propellant depots, no interplanetary space tugs, no scientific observatories, no resource utilization, no jobs, no economic engine.

There is no guarantee that the rest of the Solar System actually has a future with human civilization expanding through it. If such a future exists, we will have to build it carefully.

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

The Augustine Commission – Final Report

The final report of the Augustine Commission (all 155 pages) can be obtained here. The press conference re-iterated the Summary Report. Now we can digest the report and see what happens.

Table of Contents
Preface	7
Executive Summary	9
Chapter 1.0 Introduction	19
Chapter 2.0 US Human Spaceflight: Historical Review	27
Chapter 3.0 Goals and Future Destinations for Exploration	33
3.1 Goals for Exploration	33
3.2 Overview of Destinations and Approach	33
3.3 Mars First	35
3.4 Moon First	37
3.5 The Flexible Path to Mars	40
3.6 Summary of Strategies for Exploration Beyond Low-Earth Orbit	43
Chapter 4.0 Current Human Spaceflight Programs	47
4.1 The Space Shuttle	47
4.2 The International Space Station	51
4.3 The Constellation Program	57
Chapter 5.0 Launch to Low-Earth Orbit and Beyond	63
5.1 Evaluation Methodology for Launch Vehicles	63
5.2 Heavy Lift to Low-Earth Orbit and Beyond	64
5.3 Crew Launch to Low-Earth Orbit	68
5.4 Additional Issues in Launcher Selection	72
Chapter 6.0 Program Options and Evaluation	77
6.1 Evaluation Criteria	77
6.2 Key Decisions and Integrated Options	79
6.3 Integrated Options Constrained to the FY 2010 Budget	84
6.4 Moon First Integrated Options Fit to the Less-Constrained Budget	85
6.5 Flexible Path Integrated Options Fit to the Less-Constrained Budget	91
6.6 Comparisons Across Integrated Options	94
Chapter 7.0 Critical Technologies for Sustainable Exploration	99
7.1 Fundamental Unknowns	99
7.2 Propellant Storage and Transfer in Space	100
7.3 In Situ Propellant Production and Transport	101
7.4 Mars Orbit to Surface Transportation	102
7.5 Advanced Space Propulsion	102
7.6 Technology Summary	103
Chapter 8.0 Partnerships	105
8.1 International Partnerships	105
8.2 US Intra-Government Partnerships	107
Chapter 9.0 Concluding Observations	111
9.1 Establishing Goals	111
9.2 Matching Resources and Goals	111
9.3 NASA Management Challenges	112
9.4 Systems Engineering	113
9.5 Procuring Systems	113
9.6 Managing the Balance of Human and Robotic Spaceflight	114
9.7 Concluding Summary	115
Appendices
A Committee Member Biographies	117
B Committee Staff	123
C Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Statement of Task	127
D Charter of the Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee	131
E List of Full Committee Meetings and Locations	135
F Briefers and Committee Contacts	137
G Communications and Public Engagement	141
H Bibliography	145
Glossary Acronyms and Abbreviations	153

The Augustine Commission – Final Report and Press Conference

Tune in to NASA TV for the Press Conference and the release of the Final Report on Thursday, 22 October 2009, at 10:00 AM Phoenix time.

Press Conference – Washington, D.C.
10.22.09

Date and Time: October 22, 2009 – 1 pm EDT
Location Information:
Zenger Room of the National Press Club
529 14th St. NW, in Washington, D.C.

The Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee
Chairman Norman Augustine will hold a press conference at 1 p.m. EDT,
on Thursday, Oct. 22, in the Zenger Room of the National Press Club, 529 14th St. NW, in Washington.

Augustine will be accompanied by committee member Ed Crawley. Printed copies of the committee’s
final report will be available during the press conference and an electronic copy of the report
will be posted to the committee’s Web site at the start of the briefing.

The press conference will be broadcast on NASA Television’s Media Channel
and streamed on the agency’s Web site.

NSS Phoenix summary posts on the Final Report:

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4.)