The Augustine Commission – Final Report – Hits and Misses – Wrapped Up

“The Augustine Commission for Dummies”

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

Given the intent of the politicians to fight for the funding their districts currently receive from the Constellation Program (CxP – the current program developing the Ares I and Ares V rockets) as well as go begging for more, and given the budget constraints the NASA faces, it is instructive to see where this course will end up. In the Senate, Richard Shelby has announced his intention to fight for Constellation and will try to increase funding to the Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama. Senator Bill Nelson of Florida is fighting for Kennedy Space Center and all the jobs and funding there. In the House, Gabrielle Giffords of Arizona and Pete Olson of Texas have dug in their heels and reiterated their backing of the Constellation program (See Space News, 21 November 2009).

All this is taking place against the backdrop of the Augustine Commission’s Final Report, which has made it clear that Ares I is over budget and underpowered. As Jeff Greason said at the Committee deliberations, if Santa Clause gave us Ares I and Ares V tomorrow, we would have to scrap them immediately because they would be too expensive to operate.

The Forum at NasaSpaceFlight has been for many years the authoritative site for information on all things NASA. It has been home to the rebel alliance of NASA and industry engineers that have advocated the in-line shuttle derived launch vehicle for the past four years.

The source of this concern was former Administrator Michael Griffin’s decision in 2005 to replace the dual-launch, in-line shuttle derived architecture recommended by NASA engineers, with his personal choice of a small Ares I and a very large Ares V. Instead of building one rocket using existing shuttle components as Congress had directed, he would build two brand new rockets. This decision came just two weeks before the scheduled release of the NASA document on the Constellation program.

Now, four years later in 2009, when the in-line shuttle derived launch vehicle should have been making its first flight, we are five or six years away from Ares I making its first flight. The Shuttle is scheduled for retirement next year and America will have to buy seats on the Russian Soyuz to get to the International Space Station. And the International Space Station is scheduled for de-commissioning in 2015 and would be de-orbited into the Pacific Ocean.

This reality gave birth to the Augustine Commission and its Final Report. We have covered in detail the findings of the Committee. Now we look to consider the possible outcomes.

Philip Metschan (writing as ‘Phoegh’), a long time contributor to the Forum at NasaSpaceFlight, has produced a marvelous interactive series of graphics available at directlauncher.com that illustrate the options identified by the Augustine Commission.

The Budget and Time Line for these options are given in the following table. Included are destinations beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) and the impact of each option on the existing workforce.

Option	Extra $ / Yr	Through 2020	Through 2030	Moon	NEO	Depot	Workforce
Option 1	$0	$99 B	$205 B	?	?	?	50% Loss
Option 2	$0	$105 B	$200 B	?	?	?	60% Loss
Option 3	$3 B	$127 B	$275 B	2025	?	?	53% Loss
Option 4	$3 B	$121 B	$264 B	2030	?	?	70% Loss
Option 4B	$3 B	$118 B	$255 B	2029	?	2026	25% Loss
Option 5A	$3 B	$128 B	$272 B	?	?	?	75% Loss
Option 5B	$3 B	$123 B	$268 B	2029	2026	2024	90% Loss
Option 5C	$3 B	$120 B	$256 B	2030	2027	2025	30% Loss
Option 5D	$1 B	$116 B	$239 B	2019	2022	2028	15% Loss

We can draw the following conclusions, which are illustrated in the Graphics mentioned earlier and shown below. We start with Option 1, the Program of Record (POR – Constellation) and the funding level provided in FY 2010:

• Option 1 – Ares I crew vehicle is ready a year after the ISS is de-orbited (2015) and Ares V is completed in 2028 with no funds to conduct exploration. There is no Moon in the picture.
• Option 2 – Scrap Ares I and substitute Commercial Crew Access to LEO. The money saved is used to keep the ISS operating until 2020. Ares V is completed in 2028 with no funds to conduct exploration. There is no Moon in the picture.
• Option 3 – Add $3 Billion per year to the existing program. Ares I crew vehicle is ready a year after the ISS is de-orbited (2015) and Ares V is completed in 2019. The Moon is reached in 2025, but no other destinations beyond LEO can be funded.
• Option 4 – Add $3 Billion per year to the existing program. Scrap Ares I and substitute Commercial Crew Access to LEO. The money saved is used to keep the ISS operating until 2020. Ares V is completed in 2023. The Moon is reached in 2030, but no other destinations beyond LEO can be funded.
• Option 4B – Add $3 Billion per year to the existing program. Extend the Shuttle to 2015. Scrap Ares I and substitute Commercial Crew Access to LEO. The money saved is used to keep the ISS operating until 2020. Ares V is completed in 2023. Develop the Propellant Depot by 2026. The Moon is reached in 2030.
• Option 5A – Add $3 Billion per year to the existing program. Scrap Ares I and substitute Commercial Crew Access to LEO. The money saved is used to keep the ISS operating until 2020. Scrap Ares V in favor of a smaller Ares V Lite, which is completed in 2023. Visit EML-1 or EML-2 in 2026. Visit a Near Earth Object (NEO) Sometime in the Future.
• Option 5B – Add $3 Billion per year to the existing program. Scrap Ares I and substitute Commercial Crew Access to LEO. The money saved is used to keep the ISS operating until 2020. Scrap Ares V in favor of a commercial heavy launch capability, which is completed in 2021. Develop the Propellant Depot by 2024. Visit a Near Earth Object (NEO) in 2026 and Phobos in 2028. Return to the Moon in 2029.
• Option 5C – Add $3 Billion per year to the existing program. Scrap Ares I and substitute Commercial Crew Access to LEO. The money saved is used to keep the ISS operating until 2020. Scrap Ares V in favor of a the Direct Team’s Jupiter 241, which is completed in 2022. Visit EML-1 or EML-2 in 2023. Develop the Propellant Depot by 2024. Visit a Near Earth Object (NEO) in 2027 and Phobos in 2029. Return to the Moon in 2030.

Those are the options explored by the Augustine Commission in their Final Report.

Notice, however, that there is one more slide, Option 5D. This is the architecture that was presented to the Augustine Commission during their first public session on 17 June 2009 by the Direct Team. It provides for:

• Add $1 Billion per year to the existing program.
• Extend Shuttle until 2012.
• Scrap Ares I and develop the Jupiter Core (Jupiter 130) for carrying crew on Orion to LEO and ISS by 2014.
• Develop Commercial Crew Access to LEO to replace the Jupiter 130 by 2015. Use Jupiter 130 for ferrying the few large payloads needed by ISS.
• Continue ISS operations until 2020.
• Scrap Ares V in favor of the Upper Stage for the Jupiter Core (Jupiter 241 or Jupiter 246), which is completed in 2017.
• Visit EML-1 or EML-2 in 2018.
• Orbit the Moon in 2019.
• Visit a Near Earth Object (NEO) in 2022.
• Visit Phobos in 2025.
• Develop the Propellant Depot by 2028.

The key here is that the goal of expansion of human civilization into the Solar System is better served, is accomplished sooner, and costs less. Indeed, even without the additional $1 Billion per year, only the extension of the Shuttle operation need be eliminated.

Final Conclusions

• Options 1, 2 and 3, which are favored by the politicians with space flight facilities, get us nowhere and cost far too much.
• Options 4 and 4B get us to the Moon, but neither builds infrastructure for support of future exploration.
• Options 5A, 5B and 5C builds the skills and infrastructure for space exploration, but leave us a crew to LEO gap of five to six years.
• Option 5D builds the skills and infrastructure for space exploration, reduces the crew to LEO gap to one or two years, and gives the international community the ability to descend to the surface of the Moon and Mars.

Time is of the Essence

Finally, this note about the political realities. First, if a decision is delayed for four to six months while the politicians fight for every last bit of funding they want, the infrastructure on which the Jupiter program builds will be dismantled and Options 4B, 5C and 5D will be eliminated.

Second, Congress will likely decide that the Constellation program as currently envisioned is too costly for what will be developed and not worth throwing more money down the drain. Options 1, 2, 3, 4B and 5A will be eliminated.

Thus, only commercial crew and cargo capabilities will be funded. NASA will be reduced to research and contracting for services. The Marshall Space Flight Facility will have little purpose. And the politicians will lose most of the jobs and funding that their districts currently enjoy.

Special thanks are in order to Philip Metschan for permission to use screen shots of his presentation.

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

The Augustine Commission – Final Report – Hits and Misses – Part 5

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

In Part 1, we looked at the pieces strewn about our living room floor. In Part 2, we examined the Goals and Destinations in Chapter 3.0. And in Part 3, the three current Human Space Flight programs were reviewed (International Space Station, the Space Shuttle and the Constellation Program). In Part 4, we looked at the launch vehicles examined by The Augustine Commission.

Chapter 6 of the Augustine Commission Final Report deals with Program Options and Evaluation. This is one of the many contentious issues commentators have with the Commission. While they did select five possible exploration programs (Chapter 6), and while they did evaluate various launch vehicles (Chapter 5), the Committee seems to have ignored the possibility that different launch vehicles have greater or lesser ability to cover the five exploration programs. This failure may in the end, prove to be disastrous for human space exploration. As we write, the Space Shuttle infrastructure is being actively dismantled. The end result of failing to evaluate the physical infrastructure and the human infrastructure capable of supporting a Shuttle derived architecture may be that the United States is left with no heavy lift human space flight capability for at least the next several decades. We may have surrendered our space faring capability to Europe, China, Russia, India and Japan.

6.1 Evaluation Criteria

As noted by the Commission:

The Committee did not intend that the evaluation would generate a single numerical score; rather, it would provide a basis for comparison across options, highlighting the opportunities and challenges associated with each. Assigning weights to individual figures of merit is within the purview of the ultimate decision-makers.

Three primary evaluation dimensions were identified:

• Benefits to Stakeholders
• Risk
• Budget Realities

These three dimensions were expanded into 12 criteria for comparing the options.

• Exploration Preparation
• Technology Innovation
• Science Knowledge
• Expanding and Protecting Human Civilization
• Economic Expansion
• Global Partnerships
• Public Engagement
• Schedule and Programmatic Risk
• Mission Safety Challenges
• Workforce Impact
• Programmatic Sustainability
• Life-Cycle Cost

6.2 Key Decisions and Integrated Options

6.2.1 Key Decisions

1. What should be the future of the Space Shuttle?
2. What should be the future of the International Space Station (ISS)?
3. On what should the next heavy-lift launch vehicle be based?
4. How should crews be carried to low-Earth orbit?
5. What is the most practicable strategy for exploration beyond low-Earth orbit?

6.2.2 Integrated Options

The Committee identified five basic options: One based on the Program of Record (POR – Constellation – Ares I and V, Orion and Altair), and four alternatives. Options 2 and 3 were budget compatable alternatives to the POR. Option 4 was a Moon First program (with two variations), and Option 5 was the Flexible Path (avoiding the gravity well of the Moon).

6.2.3 Methodology for Analyzing the Integrated Options

Two budgets were used. The “Constrained Budget” used the FY 2010 budget, while the “Less Constrained Budget” allowed for an increase by 2014 of $3 Billion per year higher than FY 2010.

6.2.4 Reference Cases of the Entirely Unconstrained Program of Record

The Program of Record was evaluated and found to be a total of $45 Billion over the FY 2010 budget by 2020, wherein it is $5 Billion a year over FY 2010 in 2016 and $7 Billion per year over FY 2010 in 2019.

6.3 Integrated Options Constrained to the FY 2010 Budget

6.3.1 Evaluation of Integrated Options 1 and 2

Option 1 was found to allow for rocket development, but lacked funds for exploration. Option 2 extends the lifetime of the ISS, delays rocket development, and has no funds for exploration.

6.3.2 Examination of alternate budget guidance

The Committee found no alternatives to Options 1 or 2 that were viable under the FY 2010 budget. This conclusion has been disputed.

6.4 Moon First Integrated Options Fit to the Less-Constrained Budget

6.4.1 Evaluation of Integrated Options 3 and 4

Option 3 was to execute the POR under a less constrained budget. The ISS is de-orbited in 2010, and the Shuttle flies the remaining missions into 2011. Human lunar return occurs in the mid 2020s and the lunar base becomes operation late in the decade. An alternate extending ISS to 2020 was found to push these dates out by three to four more years.

Option 4 uses the less constrained budget, scraps Ares I and substitutes commercial crew services by 2016 It extends the ISS to 2020. Ares V is scrapped in favor of a dual-launch Ares V Lite vehicle for lunar missions.

Option 4A retires the Shuttle in 2011, while Option 4B extends the Shuttle to 2015 and develops a Shuttle Derived Heavy Lift vehicle in place of Ares V Lite.

6.4.2 Examination of the key decision on the ISS extension

Given the International Partnerships that have been developed, and the fact that the extension to 2020 would only delay the lunar return by a few years, the Committee found that the extension provides greater value than ending the ISS mission.

6.4.3 Examination of the key decision on Ares V vs. Ares V Lite dual launch

Baseline Ares V has more launch capability than the Saturn V, but current NASA studies show that when used in combination with Ares I, it does not have enough launch capability to robustly deliver the currently planned landing and surface systems to the Moon.

The Committee concluded that Ares V Lite represents less development risk, likely will reduce costs and provides more substantial margin for the lunar mission.

6.4.4 Examination of the key decision on the provision of crew transport to low-Earth orbit

Commercial crew services, based on a high-reliability rocket with a capsule and launch escape system could significantly reduce development costs, as well as lower operating costs.

6.4.5 Examination of the key question on Shuttle extension

The Committee favored early retirement of the Shuttle (2010 or 2011), although they noted several advantages to Shuttle extension to 2015, including up-mass and down-mass capability and workforce retention.

6.5 Flexible Path Integrated Options Fit to the Less-Constrained Budget

6.5.1 Evaluation of Integrated Option 5

Option 5 operates the Shuttle into 2011 and extends the International Space Station mission until 2020. A variety of destinations beyond low earth orbit are possible. The Committee developed three variants of this option.

• Option 5A develops the Ares V Lite, visits the Lagrange points, near Earth objects, on-orbit refueling and achieves a lunar return by the end of the 2020s.
• Option 5B develops commercial heavy lift capability, restructures NASA, and follows a similar mission profile as 5A, but on a slower time line.
• Option 5C scraps Ares V Lite and develops a Shuttle Derived Heavy Lift vehicle. 5C follows a similar mission profile as 5A, but on a slower time line.

6.5.2 Examination of the key question on Ares V family vs. Shuttle-derived heavy launcher

While the Shuttle derived in-line launch vehicle (SDLV) with two four-segment solid rocket motors (SRM) and the 8.4 meter external tank (ET) was the 2005 ESAS candidate for the cargo vehicle, it was forced to evolve into the Ares V due to the problems encountered with the underpowered Ares I. For some reason, the Committee decided that in order to match the capabilities of the Ares V, or the Ares V Lite dual-launch mission, that there had to be three SDLV launches. Therefore, operations would be more costly.

This is a clear Committee miss, as the current planned lunar return missions can be accomplished with good margin by a dual-launch SDLV program, thus costing less than the Ares V Lite. There is no need for the enhanced capabilities of the dual-launch Ares V Lite.

6.5.3 Examination of the key question on NASA heritage vs. EELV-heritage super-heavy vehicles

The Committee considers the EELV-heritage super-heavy vehicle to be a way to significantly reduce the operating cost of the heavy lifter to NASA in the long run. It would be a less-capable vehicle, but probably sufficiently capable for the mission. Reaping the long-term cost benefits would require substantial disruption in NASA, and force the agency to adopt a new way of doing business.

6.6 Comparisons Across Integrated Options

6.6.1 Cross-option comparisons

The Flexible Path program (Option 5A) scores more highly than the Baseline (Option 3) on 9 of the 12 criteria outlined in section 6.1 ( See figure 6.6.1-1). The higher rankings include:

• Exploration Preparation (due to much more capable launch system)
• Technology (due to investment in technology)
• Science (because of more places visited)
• Human Civilization (due to the ISS extension)
• Economic Expansion (because of commercial involvement in space elements and crew transport)
• Global Partnerships (gained by extending the ISS)
• Public Engagement (by visiting more new locations, and doing so each year)
• Schedule (exploring beyond low-Earth orbit sooner)
• Life-Cycle Costs (due to commercial crew services)

6.6.2 Examination of the key question on exploration strategy

Three exploration strategies were examined in Chapter 3. The choice of Mars First was found not to be viable due to technological problems. Two strategies remained:

• Moon First on the Way to Mars, with surface exploration focused on developing capability for Mars.
• Flexible Path to Mars via the inner solar system objects and locations, with no immediate plan for surface exploration, then followed by exploration of the lunar and/or Martian surface.

The Moon first is favorable to lunar science and exploration (although much can be done robotically). The Flexible Path missions explore more of the Solar System, while initially doing less on the Moon. Flexible Path has the advantage of developing infrastructure for deep space exploration, including the moons of Mars and Mars itself. The Committe notes that:

Considering that we have visited and obtained samples from the Moon, but not near-Earth objects or Mars, and also that the Flexible Path develops the ability to service space observatories, the Science Knowledge criterion slightly favors the Flexible Path. Broadly, the more complex the environment, the more astronaut explorers are favored over robotic exploration. In practice, this means that astronauts will offer their greatest value-added in the exploration of the surface of Mars.

Final Scoring

Although the Augustine Commission did not publish a final tally of the scores (for reasons they made clear), the following table does compare and tabulate the scores.

Option	Description	Science	Safety	Cost	Schedule	NASA / Industry Jobs	US Skills Retention	Exploration Capability	Technology	Space Colony Potential	Commercial Benefit	Public Engagement	international Cooperation	Sustainability	Total
1	The Status Quo	0	0	0	-2	-1	-1	-2	-2	-2	-1	-1	-2	-1	-15
2	ISS Extension plus Moon	0	0	1	-2	-1	-1	-2	1	-1	1	-1	0	0	-5
3	Status quo + $3 B	1	-1	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-2	0	-3
4	Shuttle + Moon	1	-1	1	0	0	-1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	4
4B	Shuttle 2015 + Moon	1	-1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	5
5A	Flexible Path + Ares Lite	2	-1	1	1	0	-1	2	1	1	2	1	0	0	9
5B	Flexible Path + Commercial	2	-2	2	1	0	-1	1	2	1	2	1	0	-1	8
5C	Flexible Path + Jupiter 241	2	-2	0	1	0	-1	1	1	1	2	1	0	1	7

Option 5D: We will have more to say about this proposal in our final segment: “Wrapped Up” or “The Augustine Commission for Dummies”.

Option	Description	Science	Safety	Cost	Schedule	NASA / Industry Jobs	US Skills Retention	Exploration Capability	Technology	Space Colony Potential	Commercial Benefit	Public Engagement	international Cooperation	Sustainability	Total
5D	Flexible Path + Direct	2	-2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	13

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

The Augustine Commission – Final Report – Hits and Misses – Part 2

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

In Part 1, we looked at the pieces strewn about our living room floor. Let’s take a closer look at the Erector Set left behind by the Augustine Commission. The pieces parts are contained in Chapters 3-6.

Chapter 3.0 Goals and Future Destinations for Exploration

Most discussions concerning the Final Report have noted the importance of the having a Goal established in order to define both destinations and architectures to achieve them. Lets start with this extended quote from the Final Report:

3.1 Goals for Exploration

We explore to reach goals, not destinations. It is in the definition of our goals that decision-making for human spaceflight should begin. With goals established, questions about destinations, exploration strategies and transportation architectures can follow in a logical order. While there are certainly some aspects of the transportation system that are common to all exploration missions (e.g. crew access and heavy lift to low-Earth orbit), there is a danger of choosing destinations and architectures first. This runs the risk of getting stuck at a destination without a clear understanding of why it was chosen, which in turn can lead to uncertainty about when it is time to move on.

One can certainly agree with the rationale for starting with Goals. However, the final phrase leads one to pause. Does the expression “when it is time to move on” mean that we abandon destinations along the path toward our Goals? Rather, does it mean that we add what’s next to our collection of destinations when we have gained the required competence and experience from work on the most recent addition to our expanding list of destinations? We shall keep these questions in mind as we work through Chapter 3.

The Commission set “charting a path for human expansion into the solar system” as the Goal. The Commission sees the development of competitive commercial industries and important national capabilities as one reason for setting the Goal they did. It also cited the resulting scientific, technological, engineering and mathematical skills as another reason for choosing this Goal. Finally, the moment when we “first learn to live on another planet” will be a milestone in human history.

3.2 Overview of Destinations and Approach

Destinations can be classified by duration of the mission: the Moon is days away, the Lagrange points weeks, the near-Earth objects months, a Mars fly-by a year, and a Mars landing is the longest—about 900 days for a round trip using the most likely approach. The result of two cycles of analyses collapsed the destinations and associated missions into three candidates:

• Mars First. It is widely accepted that Mars represents the most likely candidate for a permanent expansion of human civilization beyond the Earth. Mars is unquestionably the most complex environment for exploration, and fits Dr. Steve Squyres criteria for deploying human investigators.
• Moon First. Missions to the Moon would enable the development of the operational skills and technology for landing on, launching from and working on a planetary surface.
• Flexible Path. The Commission notes that the Flexible Path option means “we must learn to operate in free space for hundreds of days, beyond the protective radiation belts of the Earth, before we can confidently commit to exploring Mars”.

The Final Report then examines each of these options.

3.3 Mars First

The possible scenarios for Mars First are two, described by the Commission this way:

Two scenarios have been developed to examine the human exploration of Mars. In the first, the surface of Mars would be the initial and only destination, and all resources would be focused on reaching it as soon as possible. In the second, systems would be designed for Mars missions, but would be first verified on several test flights to the Moon. The latter would require some hardware modification, but would test the systems at a planetary body near the Earth before committing to a multi-year mission to Mars. In the end, the Committee decided to use the variant with a brief test flight program of equipment and procedures on the Moon as the reference Mars First option.

The first scenario was analyzed based on the existing 2007 NASA Human Exploration of Mars Design Reference Architecture 5.0 (NASA-SP-2009-566 and NASA-SP-2009-566-ADD). This architecture is shown in Figure 3.3.2-1 (p. 36). Figure 3.3.2-2 shows the architecture of first conducting several missions to the Moon.

The Commission concluded that the technological problems were many, and that a decade of research was required before design work could commence. Further, the costs were significantly higher than for either of the other two options.

Clearly, either of the possible scenarios leaves little or no infrastructure in place, and fails the Goals criteria.

3.4 Moon First

The Commission next examined the Moon First. Here, the possibility of resource utilization for supplying propellant to the space around the Earth-Moon system, as well as the scientific value of exploration based on our incomplete understanding of the Moon drive two possible scenarios. The first is a Lunar Base, where a permanent station is established, most likely at the South Pole where solar energy would be available at all times. The emphasis would be on local exploration and resource utilization for propellant manufacture.

The alternate scenario was Lunar Global, where missions of from 14 to 180 days would be flown to a variety of sites, adjusting the program as discoveries were made.

Either of these programs would be supported by one of three architectures considered by the Committee:

• Constellation “1.5 launch” architecture – one Ares I with Orion, plus one Ares V with the Altair lander. This combination is Integrated Option 3 in Chapter 6.
• Ares V Lite “dual” architecture – two Ares V Lites, one with the Orion, and one with the Altair lander. This combination is Integrated Option 4A in Chapter 6.
• A more directly Shuttle-derived launcher, which requires three launches for a crew mission plus one commercial launch of crew to low-Earth orbit. This combination is Integrated Option 4B in Chapter 6.

One is immediately struck by two contradictions within these architectures. First is the requirement for three launches for the more directly Shuttle-derived launcher, when two launches of the Jupiter 246 exceed the Constellation Program requirements. See this data sheet for the Jupiter 130 Crew and Cargo (60 mt to low earth orbit) and data sheet for the Jupiter 246 Crew and Cargo launcher (96 mt to LEO and 79 mt through TLI).

The second more serious contradiction is allowing Ares V Lite to launch crew, but requiring the Shuttle-derived vehicle to only carry cargo. The problem we face is that Ares V Lite has:

• New Engines
• New External Tank (10 meters)
• New Solid Rocket Boosters (5 segment)

Each of these requires independent rating for human flight. On the other hand, both the side-mount Shuttle-derived launch vehicle and the in-line Shuttle-derived vehicle have:

• Existing SSME (Space Shuttle Main Engines)
• Existing External Tank (8.4 meters)
• Existing 4 segment Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB)

The SSMEs and the 4 segment SRBs are already human flight qualified. The modifications to the ET would require flight testing for qualification of the in-line vehicle, but are minor compare to designing and building a brand new 10 meter tank. While the side-mount Shuttle-derived launch vehicle has disadvantages for launching crew, the in-line Shuttle-derived vehicle has no such drawbacks.

These contradictions place unwarranted obstacles on the Shuttle-derived vehicles, especially the in-line version.

3.5 The Flexible Path to Mars

The Commission states:

“The goal is to take steps toward Mars, learning to live and work in free space and near planets, under the conditions humans will meet on
the way to Mars. We must learn to operate in free space for hundreds of days, beyond the protective radiation belts of the Earth, before we can confidently commit to exploring Mars.

The primary attraction of this option is that we can build increasing confidence, infrastructure and expertise as we move from one destination to the next.

There are multiple destinations. Each one offers the opportunity to build different skills. Especially valuable would be for international partners to take on the challenge of Lunar Surface Exploration while NASA continues the research and development required for the Flexible Path missions. Both commercial enterprises and International Partners could handle the propellant delivery to the depots in LEO, EML-2, and eventually Phobos. All of this is aimed at the eventual establishment of permanent human presence on Mars.

From the perspective of the Goals given by the Commission, the Flexible Path option is the strongest.

3.6 Summary of Strategies for Exploration Beyond Low-Earth Orbit

The Committee concludes as follows:

Mars is the ultimate destination for human exploration of the inner solar system; but it is not the best first destination. Both visiting the Moon First and following the Flexible Path are viable exploration strategies. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive; before traveling to Mars, we might be well served to both extend our presence in free space and gain experience working on the lunar surface.

In the next post, we will look at the existing human space flight programs discussed in Chapter 4.0.

(Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Wrap Up.)

The Augustine Commission – Postmortem – SPI Symposium

The Space Policy Institute at George Washington University hosted a half day symposium “Assessing The Options Of The Augustine Commission For Human Spaceflight” on 28 September 2009, and has now released the Notes and presentations.

Some of the participants in the Symposium (and their presentations) were:

• Dr. Scott Pace
• Dr. Doug Stanley
• Dr. Paul Spudis
• Dr. Tom Jones
• Dr. John Logsdon
• Dr. Alain Dupas
• Mr. Brett Alexander
• Mr. Robert Read

Dr. Scott Pace, Director of the Space Policy Institute, began the proceedings by outlining the nine goals set for in the 2004 Presidential directives to NASA. Some have been, or will be, achieved:

• Complete the International Space Station
• Safely fly the Space Shuttle until 2010
• No later than 2008, begin a series of robotic missions to Moon

Some are in danger:

• Develop supporting innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures
• Promote international and commercial participation in exploration

And some will not be met:

• Develop and fly the Crew Exploration Vehicle no later 2014
• Return to Moon with goal of 2015 and no later than 2020
• Aggressive in-situ resource program and robust precursor program
• Sustained human presence on Moon for national preeminence, scientific and
  economic purposes, leading to Mars and other places

Dr. Pace reviewed the steadily declining budget provided NASA over the past five years (see the Sally Ride Slides – especially this). These cuts total approximately $42 Billion through 2020 versus the original ESAS (Exploration Systems Architecture Study) program, which topped out at $10 Billion per year in 2016 and is now expected to be only $6.5 Billion.

A critical observation was that “Budget Proposals are Policy”. Irrespective of what is said and written about America’s space policy, the budget dictates what can and cannot be done.”

Finally, Pace asked “Are there economically useful activities in space that can sustain human communities in space? Citing examples in the chart below, he concluded that we just do not know if there is anything in the upper right hand box.

The first panel of speakers was led by Gen. Lester Lyles (ret), a member of the Augustine Committee. His comments (see the Notes), centered around the task of the Commission. The Commission was tasked with assessing the following:

• Present human spaceflight program
• Future of Space Shuttle and ISS
• The necessity of heavy lift
• Crew access to low earth orbit and alternatives
• Strategies and alternatives beyond low earth orbit

Major themes to be kept in mind included: safety, reliability, innovation, affordability, and sustainability.

Finally, Lyles summed up the key findings of the Commission:

• NASA needs the right mission with the right size
• Without an adequate budget there is no way that NASA can take on the great things it is asked to and maintain a viable program for space exploration
• International partnerships should be addressed in greater detail than they are currently – there is lots of opportunities for greater partnerships and activities
• Shuttle program should be extended, whether it be for a few flights or longer, it makes sense to consider any way to minimize gap
• “Great nations do great things” – human spaceflight is a task worthy of a great nation
• Extending ISS a “no brainer”– bottom line is we are just now completing space station and the U.S. and its international partners have only just begun to utilize scientific capabilities – Could be extended to 2025
• NASA needs heavy lift capability – Looked at Ares 1, Ares V, and Ares V Light, but did not recommend one or the other; rather it depends on your objectives in space
• Committee views COTS program favorably; it should be continued – Strong potential for commercial space sector to service ISS
• A non-mission specific, basic space technology program should be established to support exploration
• There are human spaceflight pathways to Mars – Mars is the ultimate destination, but may not be the first
• Committee laid out alternatives for Moon and Mars and defined risks as best as they could

Tom Young, former CEO of Martin-Marietta, spoke next. One of his major themes was that the current situation was being driven by budget, and that the decisions made today will influence the course of space exploration for the rest of the century. He hoped that following the great adventure of the twentieth century – landing on the Moon and returning – the twenty-first century would not be remembered for “we saved $3 Billion dollars”.

Quoting from the analysis by Dwayne Day at The Space Review:

Young also warned that in order for NASA to be a smart buyer and to ensure success, the agency needed in-house systems engineering talent. Echoing Scott Pace’s earlier comments, he said that during the 1990s the United States engaged in a number of “acquisition reforms,” including the Air Force’s reduction of oversight of contractor operation of launch vehicles like the Titan IV as well as some of the aspects of NASA’s “faster, better, cheaper” program. (Author’s note: Young was clear that he was not criticizing faster, better, cheaper in its entirety.) “We just fired all of the experienced people,” Young said, and adopted a policy that “government would sit in the back of the room” and let the contractors run the show. “That was a horrible mistake. The net result of that experiment was $11.2 billion in failures. We tried that experiment, it was a horrible failure.”

Young finished by echoing previous speakers that human space flight was a policy issue, not a budget issue. He would quote Lyles: “Great Nations do Great Things”.

Next up was Dr. Doug Stanley, who has worked at NASA and Orbital Sciences Corporation, and is currently from Georgia Tech. One of the items he discussed was the idea that the assumptions made by NASA have driven the designs. For example, if the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) had not been required to go to the ISS, then the Moon mission would have been best accomplished with a dual launch of two identical rockets and an EOR-LOR strategy (Earth Orbit Rendezvous – Lunar Orbit Rendezvous). A single Shuttle Derived Launch Vehicle would be the most cost effective solution for the heavy lift requirements. But it would not be cost effective for ISS purposes.

On the other hand, if the focus had been solely on servicing the ISS, then commercial Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV – Delta IV) would have been selected. It would have been cheaper and quicker to operational status than building a new rocket.

Instead, NASA had to satisfy both objectives. And therefore, chose to develop two new rockets (new engines, new tanks, new solid rocket motors). This was the riskiest and most expensive course.

Young concludes with two sets of recommendations:

White House should immediately decide on:

• ISS extension through 2020
• Shuttle extension into 2011 and/or beyond 2011
• Beyond-LEO human mission destination(s) and time-frame
• Out-year available budget
• General policy towards commercial and international ISS crew transport

NASA should be allowed to then define design reference mission(s) and requirements and perform ESAS-like architecture study to:

• Perform apples-to-apples cost/safety/risk comparison of Augustine-defined options and selected other combinations of options
• Re-visit EELV/SDV trades – including side-mount
• Perform detailed definition and economic analysis of propellant depots
• Determine true cost/risk of “commercial” crew transport
• Examine workforce impacts of options
• Define more detailed budgets to support 2011 budget cycle

[Ed: One has to look back at Young's comment above about NASA thinking that a SDLV "...would not be cost effective for ISS purposes" and wonder why they did not realize that the SDLV would only need to be used for a year or so until EELV could come on line for ISS and other LEO missions. The implication is that EELV would have been cheaper than Ares I, and SDLV would have been cheaper than Ares V.]

The second panel discussion, on science and international relations, was begun by Paul Spudis from the Lunar and Planetary Institute.

Dr. Spudis fundamentally disagrees with the “Four Canons” of the Space Program, enshrined in the Summary Report of the Augustine Commission:

• Mars is the ultimate destination
• Heavy-lift is a requirement
• It is necessary to get the public excited
• There is no problem at NASA that money cannot fix

He contrasts the Current Template with the Desired Template:

Current Template: Custom-built, self-contained, mission specific spacecraft Launch on expendable vehicles Operate for set lifetime Abandon after use Repeat

Desired Template: Incremental, extensible building blocks Extract material and energy resources of space to use in space Launch only what cannot be fabricated or built in space Build and operate flexible, modular, extensible in-space systems Maintain, expand and use indefinitely

Obviously, Dr. Spudis takes the Long View: “My objective is to move humanity into outer space. How do you do that? By living off the land.” He wants to find opportunities in the upper right corner of Pace’s matrix.

Next up was Tom Jones, with the Association of Space Explorers and a former astronaut. His comments are summed up nicely in the abstract to the paper he presented:

By conducting a series of piloted Near-Earth Object (NEO) missions beginning about 2020, the U.S. will reinforce the scientific, economic, programmatic, operations, planetary defense, and public outreach elements of its human exploration program. Astronauts exploring a NEO would provide synergistic scientific return from a new “planetary” surface, substantially different in origin, age, and composition from those of the Moon or Mars. Explorers would assay NEO resources vital to future U.S. economic activity in space, and demonstrate extraction and utilization techniques for water, volatiles, and valuable metals. Piloted missions will also provide structural and civil engineering data needed for future deflection of hazardous NEOs. Impact prevention is a common sense, “know your enemy” mission for human explorers; the public will support space-based efforts to better understand and prevent a damaging NEO collision with Earth. Astronaut expeditions to NEOs offer dramatic, high-profile opportunities to engage the public in ground-breaking exploration more than a million miles from Earth. Finally, in the event U.S. plans for a lunar return are delayed, NEOs offer a challenging suite of alternative destinations. Easier to reach than the Moon’s surface, NEOs will nevertheless broaden U.S. space capabilities, demonstrate a firm commitment to ambitious human space activities, and increase momentum toward the eventual exploration of Mars.

Dr. John Logsdon lead of his comments on the International Space Station and International cooperation by quoting Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 16 July 2009:

“Our approach to foreign policy must reflect the world as it is, not as it used to be. It does not make sense to adapt a 19th-century concert of powers or a 20th-century balance-of-power strategy. We cannot go back to Cold War containment or to unilateralism. . . . We will lead by inducing greater cooperation among a greater number of actors and reducing competition, tilting the balance away from a multi-polar world and toward a multi-partner world.”

Dr. Logsdon advocated including India and China in multi-lateralization of space. The question in his mind was whether there would be Presidential leadership.

For the international perspective, Dr. Alain Dupas, Director of Strategic Studies at the Paris-based College de Polytechnique, presented his views on the Augustine Committee’s recent report. Europe, he said, has been under the impression that the United States had made a firm decision regarding it’s exploration program. Now, there are serious concerns about America changing its mind. Fortunately, he noted, the ISS would be supported at least through 2020. This bodes well for the discussions about the Global Exploration Strategy. Dupais noted that the Flexible Path option offered “interesting opportunities for Europe”.

Mr. Brett Alexander, from the Commercial Spaceflight Federation, led the third panel of the morning on security and commerce. One of the main points he made was that the Augustine Commission had fallen into a false dichotomy: having to choose between Ares I and commercial EELV access to space. The real issue is choosing Ares I or the International Space Station. NASA does not have the budget for both.

Finally, with regard to safety, Alexander noted that Astronauts will not fly on unproven commercial vehicles, and notes ironically that:

• The Atlas V has a long and proven track record, and the team that puts it together and launches has a demonstrated track that goes beyond the vehicle itself.
• Falcon 9 and Taurus II will have conducted multiple cargo flights to ISS under COTS prior to being permitted to ferry human crew to LEO
• Contrast this with the fact that Ares 1X/1 will have completed only two test flights prior to being permitted to carry crew to LEO

Eric Sterner spoke next. He is a former Republican House Armed Services Committee staffer and currently a fellow at the Marshall Institute. He made several points concerning international cooperation as a policy decision. First, that “International cooperation is useful but policy makers should be aware international partnerships have risks. You inherit or import into your program all their bureaucracy, all the budget woes. ISS proves you can do it, but it took us 25 years.” And second, considering China. “How would the U.S. deal with human rights issues if China were a partner in space exploration? It matters what values you take into space. How do you deal with proliferation issues? The Clinton administration threatened to cut off space-related payments to the Russia for its proliferation behavior with Iran”.

Next to last was Robert Read from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense. His remarks addressed the implications of NASA and space exploration for the Solid Rocket Motor industry. Historically, the Department of Defense (DoD) has relied on solid rocket motors for land base Minuteman III ICBM and sea launched Trident II D-5, as well as many other weapon systems. He notes that DoD is concerned that shutting down the Shuttle and SDLV programs will so shrink the market that the program might collapse. He points out that:

• One Shuttle stack is equivalent to 10 Trident II D-5 and 17 Minuteman III missiles in terms of solid propellant weight
• The DoD is concerned over the potential loss of SRM suppliers once the Shuttle is retired
• The DoD will be studying the issue further, given the national security implications of further decline of the SRM industrial base.

From The Space Review article, Read’s comments concerning how delicate the industry is at the moment:

He recounted how a few years ago a small company was going to move its operations from Texas overseas. The company’s motivation was that 95% of its business was commercial and the government accounted for only 5% of its business. But moving its manufacturing overseas would have required the government to recertify all of the company’s components, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars to the DoD, and ultimately the American taxpayers.

Finally, John Karas of Lockheed Martin addressed the workforce issues. A major concern is the loss of talent. 35% of the workforce is eligible for retirement right now. Industry needs to see NASA with a realistic goal and adequate funding in order to attract new, young talent to learn from the old guard before they retire. America’s heavy lift capability is unmatched elsewhere, and will remain so. But it can, and is currently, slipping away with the confusion and disarray of the space policy and budget problems.

So what do we garner from this long discussion? The debate is a tug of war in many dimensions: practical, political, monetary and technical.

I would like commercial crew launch to Low Earth Orbit and the ISS, a single Shuttle Derived Heavy lift vehicle and propellant depots. But that’s just my opinion.

The World At Night – Report from the Scene

The Educational Outreach programs of the National Space Society of Phoenix and the Planetary Society participated in today’s The World At Night exhibition at Christown Mall in Phoenix.

Between 1,000 and 1,500 children and parents stopped by between 10 AM and 3 PM to ask questions, collect trading cards, copies of the Ad Astra magazine, coloring sheets, stickers, decals, bookmarks, photographs and fact sheets from the members. Activities included making soda straw rockets and mission patches. Around a hundred soda straw rockets were built and launched.

The Challenger Space Center in Peoria brought out their Liquid Nitrogen demonstrations, the Dry Ice Comet, Freeze Dried Ice Cream and the Space Helmet Activity.

The Arizona State University School of Earth and Space Exploration put on some captivating exhibits including the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter Camera results from the spacecraft currently orbiting the Moon, and information on Mars, Robotics and Meteorites.

Hard At Work

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter Exhibit

Tomorrow’s News – NSS Phoenix Space News

28 September 2009

• Stephen Hawking called for a massive investment in establishing colonies on the Moon and Mars in a lecture in honour of NASA’s 50th anniversary. He argued that the world should devote about 10 times as much as NASA’s current budget – or 0.25% of the world’s financial resources – to space.
• The Ares I processing continues toward a 27 October 2009 launch. Descriptions of progress and problems can be seen here.
• For a very detailed view of the lunar surface from the LRO mission, check out this image.

For folks looking for tidbits on space exploration, add NSS Phoenix Space News page to your RSS feed.

The Augustine Commission – Letter to My Sister

My sister, who is following the blog entries about the Augustine Commission here on NSS Phoenix, wrote me and asked the following:

“OK OK since this is the other worthy human endeavor, clearly we must write our congress persons. Is it sufficient to simply tell them to LISTEN to the AUGUSTINE COMMISSION!!!!! ?”

My reply was that yes, we should tell our members of Congress to listen to the Augustine Commission. In addition, I told her that I would also advocate the exploration architecture put forward by the Direct team, which has the advantage of providing a real exploration program within the existing NASA budget. My email to her was the following:

The message is that the Augustine Commission identified the incompatibility of the Goals and the Budget.

Griffin’s Constellation program wanted the smallest crew launch vehicle (Ares I) and the largest cargo vehicle (Ares V).

Griffin wanted to be known as the biggest, baddest rocket builder ever.

Unfortunately, the Ares I is underpowered and technically challenged (see my Kansas comments in “Bad Day At Black Rock” on the NSS Phoenix blog). And the Ares V is so big that it cannot be used economically.

Neither Ares rocket is a “shuttle derived vehicle”. Each component may look like a shuttle component, but each component is brand new and needs to be rated on its own merit, which will require time and money that NASA does not have.

The Direct team recognizes both the technological and the political imperatives, and advocates a single shuttle derived vehicle that can send crew and cargo to the ISS, as well as go to Solar System destinations with the implementation of a Centaur derived upper stage and propellant depots.

When commercial crew launch and propellant launch capabilities arrive, Direct wants NASA to focus on expanding human civilization into the Solar System.

NASA has the talent and ability to do the exploration mission. We do not want to handicap NASA with the mundane operational tasks that commercial enterprises are so good at doing.

That is the message of “Bad Day At Black Rock”.

The Augustine Commission – Summary Report

The Augustine Commission released their Summary Report today, 8 September 2009.

The essence is very similar to the 12 August Meeting discussions and the conclusions reached with Sally Ride Budget charts.

The Commission ends the Introduction to the Summary Report as follows:

Key Questions to Guide the Plan for Human Spaceflight. The Committee identified the following questions that, if answered, would form the basis of a plan for U.S. human spaceflight:

• 1. What should be the future of the Space Shuttle?
• 2. What should be the future of the International Space Station (ISS)?
• 3. On what should the next heavy-lift launch vehicle be based?
• 4. How should crews be carried to low-Earth orbit?
• 5. What is the most practicable strategy for exploration beyond low-Earth orbit?

The Committee considers the framing and answering of these questions individually, and in a consistent way, to be at least as important as their combinations in the integrated options for a human spaceflight program.

They then review the Current Program in Section 1:

• The Space Shuttle
• The International Space Station
• The Constellation Program

Following this review, Section 2 is devoted to the capability of launch to Low Earth Orbit and exploration beyond LEO. The Heavy Lift requirements and capabilities of the various programs available are summarized in this chart from the report:

Heavy Lift Chart

The Summary then reviews the crew to low Earth orbit possibilities. The conclusion, although the Commission has explicitly stated they will only present options, is that crew access to LEO is best served by commercial launch services provided by the private sector.

Section 2 concludes with considerations about lowering costs of space exploration. The following quotes are indicative of their thinking:

The Committee concludes that an architecture for exploration employing a similar policy
of guaranteed contracts has the potential to stimulate a vigorous and competitive commercial space
industry.

The Committee strongly believes it is time for NASA to reassume its crucial role of
developing new technologies for space. Today, the alternatives available for exploration systems
are severely limited because of the lack of a strategic investment in technology development in past
decades. NASA now has an opportunity to develop a technology roadmap that is aligned with an
exploration mission that will last for decades. If appropriately funded, a technology development
program would re-engage the minds at American universities, in industry and within NASA. The
investments should be designed to increase the capabilities and reduce the costs of future
exploration. This will benefit human and robotic exploration, the commercial space community,
and other U.S. government users.

Section 3 presents the options for Future Destinations for Exploration. There are three:

• Mars first, with a Mars landing, perhaps after a brief test of equipment and procedures on
  the Moon.
• Moon first, with lunar surface exploration focused on developing the capability to
  explore Mars.
• Flexible path to inner solar system locations, such as lunar orbit, Lagrange points, near-
  Earth objects and the moons of Mars, followed by exploration of the lunar surface and/or
  Martian surface.

Section 4 brings the previous sections together in an Integrated Program Options chart:

Integrated Program Options

Section 5 discusses Organizational and Programmatic Issues. Two critical elements are:

• NASA should be given the maximum flexibility possible under the law to establish and
  manage its systems.
• Finally, significant space achievements require continuity of support over many years.

Section 6 presents a summary of key findings

As noted at the outset, there is nothing appreciably new in this Summary Report. The interesting and controversial information is buried in the internal documents and analyses. We await those choice morsels.

Lagrange Point

In the vicinity of two bodies in space that orbit each other lie five Lagrange points, named after Joseph-Louis Lagrange, the French / Italian mathematician (1736-1813). Lagrange made major contributions to various branches of mathematics, and discovered the Lagrange points in 1772 while working on the three body problem, first described by Sir Isaac Newton in 1687. The diagram at the left shows the location of the five points. The Earth-Moon system has five Lagrange points, commonly labeled EML-n, and the Sun-Earth system has five points, labeled SEL-n: L-1 is, as one might suspect, located between the two bodies, where the gravitational pull of each body equals the other. This point is unstable. That is, if a satellite deviates in any way from the point, it will fall into the gravity well of one or the other bodies. The Solar and Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO) is located at SEL-1 in a Halo Orbit. L-2 is beyond the smaller body, where the combined gravitational pull of the two bodies balances the centrifugal force of the satellite. Satellites currently at SEL-2 include the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe, the Planck space observatory and Herschel Space Observatory. L-2 is also an unstable point, and all three satellites occupy Lissajous orbits around the Lagrange point L-3 lies beyond the larger body away from the smaller body. SEL-3 is on the other side of the Sun from the Earth. L-4 lies at the corner of an equilateral triangle whose base is between the two bodies, ahead of the direction of the orbit of the smaller body. The Trojan asteroids occupy SJL-4 and SJL-5 of the Sun-Jupiter system. Both L-4 and L-5 are stable, as shown by the gravity contours in the diagram. L-5 lies at the corner of an equilateral triangle whose base is between the two bodies, behind the direction of the orbit of the smaller body. EML-4 and EML-5 were popularized by G. K. Oneill as places to build human space colonies. This was the impetus for the founding of the L5 Society. Wikipedia has an excellent article on Lagrange points in space.

Image from notes by Neil J. Cornish from the NASA WMAP Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe web site.

International Space Station – Ralf Vandebergh Photograph From Earth

Photograph used by permission of Ralf Vendebergh

I recently ran across this amazing picture of the International Space Station taken by Ralf Vandebergh. So I went looking for his work on the web. It is fascinating stuff Ralf uses a 10 inch Newtonian telescope with a videocam eyepiece. He manually tracks the ISS and other objects across the sky. Due to atmospheric turbulence (its why stars twinkle), a portion of one image may be clear and another blurry. By judicious combination of various images from the video and that good old standby Photoshop, you can create a nice image. Ralf has one from 21 March 2009 showing an astronaut performing a spacewalk outside the ISS. If you want to compare ISS components with what you see in the images, consult the link. Here are some additionl links: Mike Salway’s collection of Ralf’s images. Ralf’s Saturn weather photographs are at Saturn Report A NASA Image entitlrd “Space Station Construction Visible in Backyard Telescopes” A complete inventory can be found here. You can follow Ralf on Twitter